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Abstract
This thesis looks at the interactions between fiscal, monetary and structural policies along
three dimensions.
The first paper looks at the dynamic effects of structural reforms when monetary pol-
icy is constrained. Structural reforms entail short run output costs that can be offset by
a demand expansion. When monetary policy cannot carry out this short run expansion,
there is a role for fiscal policy. In this case, reforms imply a fiscal cost in the short run,
which can be justified by a long run improvement in public finances. This paper quantifies
the short run costs and long run benefits of potential reforms in Europe. Results show
that output losses from reforms can be fully offset with a modest fiscal stimulus. While
for product market reforms this cost is justified by the long run fiscal gains, labour market
reforms alone do not provide a sufficient boost to long run tax revenues.
The second paper looks at the transmission of fiscal policy in an economy characterised
by tax evasion and corruption. Cross-country evidence highlights the importance of these
features in determining fiscal multipliers, and VAR evidence suggests that spending cuts
reduce tax evasion, while tax hikes increase it. In a model with an underground sector,
spending cuts reallocate production towards the formal sector, thus reducing tax evasion.
Tax hikes increase incentives to produce in the less productive informal sector, implying
higher output losses. Embezzlement of public revenues further amplifies these losses by
requiring larger tax hikes to reduce debt. The model corroborates the evidence of increased
levels of tax evasion during recent fiscal consolidations in southern Europe.
The final paper compares price-based and quantity-based fiscal adjustments when infla-
tion is low. Focusing on the public wage bill, this translates to fiscal consolidation through
cuts to public wages or public employment. In both cases, low inflation eliminates the ex-
pansionary effects of the consolidation for the private sector. The drag in economic activity
is substantially amplified, with increased debt-to-GDP levels during the consolidation.
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Summary
This thesis consists of three papers looking at the interactions between fiscal, mon-
etary and structural policies.
The first chapter looks at the relationship between structural reforms and fiscal
policy, quantifying both the short run fiscal costs of reforms, and the long run impact
of reforms on public finances, with the aim of seeing the extent to which the latter
justify the former.
The slow recovery of countries within the Euro-area since the Great Recession
has been widely documented. In this climate, policy makers are turning to alterna-
tive policy measures to boost economic growth, with particular focus on structural
reforms. Reducing structural rigidities can improve the efficiency of resource allo-
cation, the competitiveness of countries within the single market and resilience to
economic shocks. As well as uncertainty about their future benefits, and their re-
distributive effects, the main obstacles for carrying out structural reforms are the
potential short run costs.
While reforms are expected to increase activity in the long run, this comes at the
expense of a short run contraction, which can be countered by short run policy mea-
sures to boost demand. These expansionary policies would typically be carried out
by monetary policy. Therefore, in situations when monetary policy is constrained,
reforms can be costly. As in other contexts, policy makers have looked at the possi-
bility of using fiscal policy to provide the necessary demand expansion, in order to
mitigate the short run costs and so reduce the obstacles to reform. While a fiscal
expansion can reduce the short run output or employment costs of reform, this can
be costly in terms of public debt and deficit, and so requires sufficient fiscal space.
The short run fiscal expansion is desirable so long as the reform has a positive effect
on public finances in the long run. This is particularly important at a time when
fiscal consolidation itself is a key policy concern.
Whether future gains can repay the costs of reforms, and the horizon over which
this effect can materialise, is ultimately a quantitative question. This chapter stud-
ies this issue using a general equilibrium model, based on Eggertsson, Ferrero and
Raffo (2014), extended to include a richer fiscal block. Reforms are simulated as a
transition to a new steady state in which the wage and price mark-ups are reduced.
The simulations show that while reforms in normal times boost output in every pe-
riod, reforms implemented during the zero lower bound (ZLB) crisis entail output
losses in the short run. Furthermore, this model shows that the fall in output also
leads to a rise in the deficit-to-GDP ratio during the reform, even absent any active
fiscal stimulus. These results also hold true in the case where the monetary policy
constraint is imposed exogenously and the nominal interest rate is fixed at its steady
state. In this case, abstracting from the direct negative effects of the ZLB crisis,
the reforms are again found to be contractionary in the short run. Next, an active
fiscal stabilisation rule is introduced, which induces a fiscal stimulus that offsets the
short run output costs of the reforms under constrained monetary policy. This will
entail an additional rise in the deficit, which captures the short run fiscal costs of
the reform. In the long run, the deficit will reach a lower post-reform steady state,
this is the long run fiscal gains from the reform.
The size of both the long run fiscal gains and the short run cost of the fiscal
stimulus will depend on the model parameterisation and the precise reform being
considered. In particular, comparing a symmetric reduction in both price and wage
mark-ups against the same reduction in either one or the other, referred to as product
and labour market reforms respectively, there is a clear advantage in carrying out
product market reforms. In fact, labour market reforms create almost no increase
in the long run deficit-to-GDP ratio, but still necessitate a short run fiscal stimulus.
This is because while the reform increases employment at the new steady state, it
also reduces wages, and the net effect on the government’s tax revenues is negligible.
Of course, another way to interpret this result is that it is necessary to complement
labour market reforms with simultaneous product market reforms so that the short
run fiscal costs of the former can be justified by the long run gains of the latter.
The aim of the second chapter is to revisit the effects of government expenditure
cuts and labor tax hikes on output, unemployment and welfare, when tax evasion and
corruption are present. Although the recent fiscal crisis has sparked a considerable
amount of research measuring the macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidations,
this literature has left aside these two crucial political economy aspects. This is
surprising, given that they are important features in many of the countries adopting
consolidation policies, as well as the growing evidence that tax evasion and corruption
have increased in recent years.
Many authors have studied whether it is preferable to rely on spending cuts or
tax hikes when consolidating the public deficit. Overall, the findings are not con-
clusive. Indeed, there is strong evidence that the effects of fiscal consolidations are
not yet fully understood. Blanchard and Leigh (2013) find that forecasts of output
growth systemetically underestimate the size of fiscal multipliers. We show that this
underestimation of fiscal multipliers is more pronounced in countries with a higher
level of tax evasion and/or corruption, suggesting that these two features amplify the
effects of fiscal consolidations. Furthermore, we incorporate a time series on informal
employment in Italy in a VAR, and identify the effects of fiscal consolidations occur-
ring through a fall in government consumption expenditure or an increase in direct
taxes. We find that both types of shocks are contractionary, both reducing output
and increasing unemployment. However, tax hikes significantly increase informal
employment, while spending cuts reduce it.
To understand the mechanisms driving the results, we reassess the effects of
fiscal consolidations in a model with price stickiness, search and matching frictions,
endogenous labor force participation, tax evasion and corruption. We find that tax
evasion and corruption imply that a larger increase in the tax rate is needed to
reduce debt, and this amplifies the distortionary effects of the consolidation. Tax
evasion further increases the output losses after a tax hike because workers and firms
reallocate resources to the informal sector, increasing inefficiencies since this sector
is less productive. On the other hand, government spending cuts create a positive
wealth effect which increases consumption and investment and reduces labor force
participation. Relative to standard models, tax evasion and corruption increase the
size of this wealth effect, thereby increasing the crowding-in of private consumption,
and reducing output losses. Agents reallocate their labor search towards the formal
sector, first because it is more productive, and second because the formal labor
market has a higher matching efficiency and a lower job destruction rate. Hence,
the share of shadow employment in total employment is reduced. Labor tax hikes
are costly in terms of welfare, but spending cuts typically involve welfare gains,
since private consumption increases and labor supply decreases. The latter result is
reversed, however, if government spending directly enters the utility of households,
or if agents are liquidity constrained.
We use our model to compare the recent consolidation policies in Greece, Italy,
Spain and Portugal, all countries that are characterized by both high corruption and
tax evasion. Despite the fact that the consolidation plans rely heavily on spending
cuts, the model predicts increasing levels of tax evasion in all countries, as well as
prolonged recessions. The largest output losses are observed in Portugal, due to
the size of the tax hikes, and Greece, due to the severity of the austerity measures.
There are also substantial welfare losses in all countries; the largest occurs in Portugal
because of the significant tax hikes in the consolidation package. To quantitatively
evaluate the welfare gains from fighting tax evasion and corruption, we perform
a counterfactual analysis of the consolidation plans when we reduce the degree of
corruption and tax evasion. We find that both battles are worth fighting as they
significantly reduce the welfare losses from fiscal consolidation.
The third chapter examines the effects of alternative fiscal consolidation strate-
gies to reduce the public wage bill, specifically comparing price-based measures and
quantity-based measures, under different inflation environments. An important fea-
ture of the current economic conditions in the EU, which challenges the design and
implementation of macroeconomic policy, is inflation uncertainty. With monetary
policy constrained by the ZLB, inflation in the euro area has remained below the
ECB’s medium-run objective for some time. While some recent studies have looked
at the impact of the ZLB on fiscal policy, research on the differential impact of
inflation on different budgetary items is limited.
Low inflation is generally considered to make fiscal consolidation more difficult.
From a theoretical point of view, low inflation reduces the growth in nominal GDP
and, all else equal, raises deficit- and debt-to-GDP ratios. Debt dynamics would
be left unchanged if nominal interest rates fall by the same magnitude as inflation,
thus leaving real rates unchanged. Instead, when nominal rates have hit the ZLB,
falling inflation leads to rising real interest rates, making it more difficult to reduce
government debt-to-GDP ratios.
Moreover, much of the literature, both theoretical and empirical, has found that
fiscal multipliers are higher when monetary policy is constrained. The converse of
these arguments is that attempting to carry out fiscal consolidation in a liquidity
trap can be very costly, and even self-defeating.
Another important way in which low inflation affects fiscal policy is the fact that
inflation shocks can be expected to have a different impact, both in terms of size
and timing, across different government revenue and expenditure categories. One
dimension of this comparison which has been overlooked is that the effectiveness
of consolidation packages that focus on quantity-based measures instead of price-
based measures may be different depending on the inflation environment. In that
context, reducing the wage bill via cutting wages (price-based measure) or reducing
public employees (quantity-based measure) may have a different budgetary impact
depending on the inflation environment.
This chapter aims to uncover the potential effect of a low-inflation environment
on these alternative consolidation strategies, with a particular focus on the public
wage bill. Recent austerity packages implemented in many European countries, like
Greece and Spain, have placed special emphasis on the reduction of the public wage
bill. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2008, many countries have been trying to
cut government wage bills, by freezing wages and hirings, and cutting or retrenching
specific indemnities or benefits.
We develop a DSGE model through which we can study the differential effects of
quantity-based and price-based consolidation measures. In particular, we consider a
New-Keynesian model of a two-block monetary union, with nominal rigidities in the
form of monopolistic retailers facing price-stickiness. In order to build a complete
model of the labour market, we incorporate both search and matching frictions,
leading to involuntary unemployment, and an endogenous labour force participation
decision, leading to voluntary unemployment. Finally, to study the effects of the
public wage bill, we allow the government to hire public employees to produce a
public good that is used by private firms.
In our model, in normal times, a fiscal consolidation through a cut in public wages
is able to reduce the public debt-to-GDP ratio faster than public vacancy costs,
although both have similar positive effects on private output through an increase
in private-sector hirings. In the case of public wage cuts the increase in private-
sector employment dominates the fall in public employment, leading to a fall in
the unemployment rate, while in the case of public vacancy cuts the unemployment
rate rises. Hence, public wage cuts are a preferable consolidation strategy to public
vacancy cuts in normal times.
In a low inflation environment, induced by a negative demand shock, the fall
in demand leads to a fall in private output, which, along with the rise in the real
interest rate, causes government debt-to-GDP to rise. Hence a much larger cut in
the public wage bill is required to bring debt to the desired level, meaning that
the consolidation in this environment has large negative effects. The differences
between the two instruments appear less pronounced in a low inflation environment;
yet, again, public wage cuts lead to a reduction in the long-run unemployment rate,
while public vacancy cuts induce a persistent rise in unemployment.

Chapter 1
Structural Reforms under
Constrained Monetary Policy: the
Case for Fiscal Stimulus
Abstract
Given the weak economic performance of many European countries since the
recent crisis, there is an increasing need for structural reforms aimed at pro-
moting long run growth. Reforms entail short run output costs that must
be offset by a demand expansion. When monetary policy is constrained and
cannot carry out this short run expansion, there is a potential role for fiscal
policy. In this case, reforms imply a fiscal cost in the short run, which can
be justified if they improve public finances in the long run. The aim of this
paper is to quantify the short run fiscal costs and long run benefits of reforms,
and investigate how the design of reforms can affect this trade-off. Results
show that short run output losses from reforms can be fully offset by allowing
a modest fiscal stimulus. While for product market reforms this cost is fully
justified by the long run gains, labour market reforms alone do not provide
a sufficient boost to long run tax revenues. For major European countries, a
modest reform in both product and labour markets is shown to entail between
0.04− 0.12pp increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio, and provide a 0.1pp reduc-
tion in this ratio in the long run.
1.1 Introduction
Since the recent economic crises, many European countries have continued to exhibit
weak economic growth and high unemployment. This has been further exacerbated
by both contractionary fiscal policy, as many countries are undergoing fiscal consoli-
dation, and monetary policy that is constrained at the zero lower bound. These short
run policy constraints have increased the importance of measures to boost growth in
the long run. Particular focus has been on structural reforms aimed at either increas-
ing competition in product markets or increasing the flexibility of labour markets.
However, the short run costs associated with these reforms are also affected by these
short run policy constraints. In particular, with monetary policy constrained, there
is an increasing need for fiscal policy to offset short run output costs while reforms
are being implemented. This paper looks at the relationship between reforms and
fiscal policy in this context, quantifying both the short run fiscal costs of reforms,
and the long run impact of reforms on public finances, with the aim of seeing the
extent to which the latter justify the former.
The slow recovery of countries within the Euro-area since the Great Recession
has been widely documented. As summarised in the IMF World Economic Outlook,
2015, the Euro-area is still facing increasing levels of public debt, and is struggling
to maintain adequate growth levels, with some countries facing especially high levels
of unemployment. In this climate, policy makers are turning to alternative policy
measures to boost economic growth, with particular focus on structural reforms.
Reducing structural rigidities can improve the efficiency of resource allocation, the
competitiveness of countries within the single market and resilience to economic
shocks.1 The lack of competition and flexibility in countries such as Spain and Italy
have been blamed for worsening the effects of the recent crisis and slowing their
recovery. While structural reforms have been a key policy issue in these countries for
many years, the crisis has renewed the momentum for their implementation. This
can be seen, for example, with the Europe 2020 strategy, which, in contrast to the
Lisbon Treaty, has induced active implementation of structural reforms in recent
years.2
Despite the reforms which have already been legislated or implemented across
Europe, a lot remains to be done. As well as uncertainty about their future benefits,
and their redistributive effects, the main obstacles for carrying out structural reforms
1See, for example, Griffith and Harisson (2004), Duval and Vogel (2008) and Gnocchi et al.
(2015).
2See, for example, OECD (2013) and European Commission (2013, 2014) for analyses of the
recent reforms implemented in southern Europe.
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are the potential short run costs. While reforms are expected to increase activity
in the long run, this comes at the expense of a short run contraction, which can
be countered by short run policy measures to boost demand. On the one hand,
papers such as Eggertsson et al. (2014) and Vogel (2014), which look at structural
reforms as reductions in price and wage mark-ups, focus on the short run deflationary
effect of reforms, which then require a demand expansion to stabilise inflation. On
the other hand, Cacciatore et al. (2016) focus on the transitional costs of reforms by
modeling slow or costly product and labour market adjustments. In their framework,
reforms are not deflationary, but again the optimal policy response is to use a demand
expansion to bring forward the long run gains from the reform.
In both cases, the expansionary policies to offset the short run costs of the reforms
would typically be carried out by monetary policy. Therefore, in situations when
monetary policy is constrained, reforms can be costly. This argument was made
in the early days of the Euro-area, since common monetary policy would no longer
respond to inflation in individual countries, and has recently become relevant again
with monetary policy constrained by the zero lower bound. As in other contexts,
policy makers have looked at the possibility of using fiscal policy to provide the
necessary demand expansion, in order to mitigate the short run costs and so reduce
the obstacles to reform.
Acknowledging the potential fiscal costs of reforms in a monetary union, the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has incorporated explicit exceptions for countries
carrying out structural reforms. For example, proposals laid out in 2002 state that
“A small temporary deterioration in the underlying budget position of a member
state could be envisaged, if it derives from the introduction of a large structural
reform” (European Commission 2002). More recently, the European Commission
has released a report reiterating the flexibility within the SGP rules for countries
carrying out structural reforms (European Commission 2015), and the head of the
European Central Bank has repeatedly called for fiscal authorities to facilitate the
implementation of structural reforms, stressing that “existing flexibility within the
[SGP] rules allows the budgetary costs of major structural reforms to be addressed
and demand to be supported” (see Draghi 2014a,b,c).
While a fiscal expansion can reduce the short run output or employment costs
of reform, this can be costly in terms of public debt and deficit, and so requires
sufficient fiscal space.3 The formulation of the flexibility in the SGP rules highlights
the short run to long run trade-off in accommodating the fiscal costs of reform. The
3There can also be direct budgetary costs from some reforms, but these tend to have negligible
impact on overall deficit.
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short run fiscal expansion is desirable so long as the reform has a positive effect on
public finances in the long run.4 This is particularly important at a time when fiscal
consolidation itself is a key policy concern.
Whether future gains can repay the costs of reforms, and the horizon over which
this effect can materialise, is ultimately a quantitative question. This paper studies
this issue using the framework of Eggertsson et al. (2014), extended to include a
richer fiscal block. Reforms are simulated as a transition to a new steady state in
which the wage and price mark-ups are reduced.
In line with Eggertsson et al. (2014), the simulations show that while reforms in
normal times boost output in every period, reforms implemented during the ZLB
crisis entail output losses in the short run. These results are also extended along two
dimensions. Firstly, the fiscal block in this model shows that the fall in output also
leads to a rise in the deficit-to-GDP ratio during the reform, even absent any active
fiscal stimulus. Secondly, these results hold true in the case where the monetary
policy constraint is imposed exogenously and the nominal interest rate is fixed at its
steady state. In this case, abstracting from the direct negative effects of the ZLB
crisis, the reforms are again found to be contractionary in the short run.
To address the underlying question of this paper, an active fiscal stabilisation rule
is introduced, which induces a fiscal stimulus that offsets the short run output costs
of the reforms under constrained monetary policy. This will entail an additional rise
in the deficit, which captures the short run fiscal costs of the reform. In the long
run, the deficit will reach a lower post-reform steady state, this is the long run fiscal
gains from the reform. With the parameterisation of Eggertsson et al. (2014), the
baseline reform of a 1% reduction in both price and wage mark-ups implies a 0.15pp
reduction in the steady state deficit-to-GDP ratio, and active fiscal policy induces a
fiscal stimulus of 0.6% of the pre-reform GDP. This costs can be repaid in around 5
quarters at the new steady state.
The size of both the long run fiscal gains and the short run cost of the fiscal
stimulus will depend on the model parameterisation and the precise reform being
considered. In particular, comparing a symmetric reduction in both price and wage
mark-ups against the same reduction in either one or the other, referred to as product
and labour market reforms respectively, there is a clear advantage in carrying out
product market reforms. In fact, labour market reforms create almost no increase
4Of course it should be noted that there are political issues at play here. See, for example,
Beetsma and Debrun (2005) for a discussion of the politics of enforcing these ‘flexible’ SGP rules,
and Beetsma and Debrun (2004) and Poplawski Ribeiro and Beetsma (2008) for a discussion of the
political incentives to implement reforms when facing fiscal rules.
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in the long run deficit-to-GDP ratio, but still necessitate a short run fiscal stimulus.
This is because while the reform increases employment at the new steady state, it
also reduces wages, and the net effect on the government’s tax revenues is negligible.
Of course, another way to interpret this result is that it is necessary to complement
labour market reforms with simultaneous product market reforms so that the short
run fiscal costs of the former can be justified by the long run gains of the latter.
To illustrate the short run costs and long run benefits of reforms for relevant
parameterisations, the model is re-calibrated for France, Italy and Spain. In the case
of France, the baseline reform entails a short run fiscal stimulus of 0.3% of the pre-
reform GDP over 2 years, and a long run gain of 0.13pp in the deficit-to-GDP ratio.
For Italy and Spain, the short run costs are smaller, at 0.2% and 0.1% respectively,
while the long run gains are around the same size, at 0.11pp for both countries.
This implies that for Italy and Spain the reforms are much more self-financing in the
long run. Furthermore, in the framework of the SGP, this stimulus would require
a relatively small deviation from the 3% deficit-to-GDP target, at its peak around
0.12pp, 0.08pp and 0.04pp for the three countries respectively.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section will lay out
the model. Section 1.3 shows comparative statics for different levels of structural
rigidities, dynamic simulations of reform episodes, and quantitative comparisons of
the size of the fiscal costs and benefits of reform for different parameterisations of
the model. Building on these quantitative comparisons, in Section 1.4 compares the
effects of different reform packages in France, Italy and Spain. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 The Model
The model closely follows that of Eggertsson et al. (2014), henceforth EFR. The
economy consists of a two-block monetary union. Each block produces tradable
and non-tradable goods using sector-specific labour, which is aggregated from the
differentiated labour supplied by households. In each sector, there exist competi-
tive firms using labour to produce intermediate goods, monopolistically competitive
firms which use the intermediate goods to produce differentiated goods, and compet-
itive retailers which aggregate these goods into the final goods. Households receive
utility from a final consumption good, which is aggregated from non-tradables and
both domestically-produced and foreign-produced tradables, as well as disutility from
labour. Households save through domestic government bonds and an internationally
traded risk-free bond. As well as issuing debt, the government collects taxes to
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finance wasteful consumption expenditures.
The following is an exposition of the ‘Home’ block of the union. The ‘Foreign’
block follows the same structure.
1.2.1 Household
There is a continuum of households of mass σ, indexed by j. Each household derives
utility from consumption, ct(j), and disutility from labour, nt(j). The expected value
of the infinite stream of utility is given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
β ßt U(ct(j), nt(j)) = E0
∞∑
t=0
β ßt
[
ct(j)
1−η
1− η −
nt(j)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
(1.1)
where β is the discount factor and ßt is an exogenous demand shock. In the utility
function, η is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ϕ is the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
The final consumption good is an aggregate of the tradable and non-tradable
goods, given by:
ct(j) =
[
(1− θ) 1ξ cTt(j)
ξ−1
ξ + θ
1
ξ cNt(j)
ξ−1
ξ
] ξ
ξ−1
where the tradable consumption good is itself aggregated from domestic and foreign
produced goods:
cTt(j) =
[
(1− α) 1φ cHt(j)
φ−1
φ + α
1
φ cFt(j)
φ−1
φ
] φ
φ−1
where α captures the openness of the country (the inverse of the home-bias), and φ
is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
The intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
ct(j) + bGt+1(j) + bFt+1(j) ≤ (1− τn)wt(j)nt(j)
+
RHt−1
pit
bGt(j) +
RFt−1
pit
bFt(j) + Πt(j) + Tt (1.2)
where bGt(j) is the real holdings of domestic government bonds, bFt(j) is the real
holdings of foreign bonds, RHt and RFt are the gross nominal interest rates on do-
mestic and foreign bonds respectively, pit is the gross inflation rate of the CPI, defined
below, wt(j) is the real wage of household j, Πt(j) are the profits from the monop-
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olistically competitive firms, which will be discussed below, τn represents taxes on
labour income, and Tt is a lump-sum transfer from the government.
The household delegates the labour supply decision to a labour union, which will
be discussed below, and so takes nt(j) as given. Thus the household chooses ct(j),
bGt+1(j) and bFt+1(j) so as to maximise lifetime utility (1.1), subject to the budget
constraint (1.2). Letting λt(j) denote the multiplier on this constraint, the first order
conditions for the households are:
ct(j)
−η = λt(j) (1.3)
ßtλt(j) = βEtßt+1λt+1(j)
RHt
pit+1
(1.4)
ßtλt(j) = βEtßt+1λt+1(j)
RFt
pit+1
(1.5)
Note that equations (1.4) and (1.5) imply that in equilibrium RHt = RFt.
For the optimal level of the final consumption good ct(j), the households choose
the components, cNt(j), cHt(j) and cFt(j) to minimise their expenditure, given the
respective prices PNt, PTt and P
∗
Tt. Firstly, for a given cTt(j), the cost minimisa-
tion yields the following demand functions for home- and foreign-produced tradable
goods:
cHt(j) = (1− α)
(
PTt
PTt
)−φ
cTt(j) and cFt(j) = α
(
P ∗Tt
PTt
)−φ
cTt(j)
where PTt is the aggregate price of the tradable consumption bundle, defined as:
PTt = [(1− α)P 1−φTt + α(P ∗Tt)1−φ]
1
1−φ
Then, similarly, the composition of tradable and non-tradable consumption satisfies
the following demand functions:
cNt(j) = (1− θ)
(
PNt
Pt
)−ξ
ct(j) and cTt(j) = θ
(PTt
Pt
)−ξ
ct(j)
where Pt is the aggregate price of the final consumption bundle, the CPI, defined as:
Pt = [(1− θ)P 1−ξNt + θP1−ξT t ]
1
1−ξ
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1.2.2 Production
In each sector, labour inputs are used to produce intermediate goods. These goods
are sold to a continuum of monopolistic firms which turn them into differentiated
goods. Finally, a retailer buys all varieties of these good and produces a final good.
For simplicity, the exposition of these steps will be carried out in reverse order, for
the sector k = T, N , with θT ≡ θ and θN ≡ (1− θ) denoting the size of each sector.
Retailers A competitive retailer aggregates a continuum of differentiated goods,
indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], as follows:
ykt =
[(
1
θk
) 1
k
ˆ θk
0
ykt(i)
k−1
k di
] k
k−1
where k is the elasticity of subsitution betwen the different varieties.
Letting Pkt denote the price at which the retailer sells the final good ykt, and
Pkt(i) denote the price at which they buy each good ykt(i), the profit of the retailer
can be written as:
Pktykt −
ˆ θk
0
Pkt(i)ykt(i)di
Note that for k = T , this equation assumes that the law of one price holds. The
zero-profit condition therefore defines the aggregate price as:
Pkt =
(
1
θk
ˆ θk
0
Pkt(i)
1−kdi
) 1
1−k
The cost minimisation of this transaction yields the following demand schedule
for each differentiated good:
ykt(i) =
1
θk
(
Pkt(i)
Pkt
)−k
ykt (1.6)
Monopolistic Firms There is a measure of mass θk of monopolistic firms produc-
ing differentiated goods in each sector. These firms buy intermediate goods at unit
price MCkt, and differentiate them with a technology that transforms one unit of
intermediate goods into one unit of differentiated goods.
Following Calvo (1983), in any given period each firm can reset their price with
a fixed probability (1 − χp). A firm, i, that is able to reset their price chooses the
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optimal price level, P˜kt(i), so as to maximize expected profits given by:
Et
∞∑
s=0
χspΛt,t+s
(
P˜kt(i)−MCkt+s
)
ykt+s(i)
subject to the demand schedule, (1.6), where Λt,t+s is a stochastic discount factor
and ykt+s(i) is the output of firm i.
Since all firms are ex-ante identical, all optimising firms will choose the same
optimal price, that is P˜kt(i) = P˜kt. The resulting expression for P˜kt, is:
P˜kt =
k
k − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 χ
s
pΛt,t+sMCkt+sykt+s (Pkt+s)
k
Et
∑∞
s=0 χ
s
pΛt,t+sykt+s (Pkt+s)
k−1 (1.7)
Intermediate Goods Firms Intermediate goods, xkt, are produced with the fol-
lowing technology:
xkt = zktnkt
where zkt is an exogenous productivity factor, and nkt is the aggregate labour input.
For a given aggregate nominal wage, Wkt, the firm’s profit maximisation yields the
standard first order condition:
Wkt = MCktzkt
The labour input is aggregated from the differentiated labour supply according
to:
nkt =
[(
1
θkσ
) 1
γk
ˆ θkσ
0
nt(j)
γk−1
γk dj
] γk
γk−1
where γk denotes the elasticity of substitution between different labour types, and
θkσ is the mass of households working in sector k in the Home economy. Since this
aggregation is costless, the aggregate wage index must satisfy
Wktnkt =
ˆ θkσ
0
Wt(j)nt(j)dj
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and is therefore given by:
Wkt =
(
1
θkσ
ˆ θkσ
0
Wt(j)
1−γkdj
) 1
1−γk
The cost-minimisation problem of the firm gives the following demand schedule
for each type of labour:
nt(j) =
1
θkσ
(
Wt(j)
Wkt
)−γk
nkt for j ∈ k
1.2.3 Labour Union
The households delegate the labour supply decision to a labour union. As with
price-setting, in any given period the union can reset the wage of each household
with a fixed probability (1 − χw). When they are able to reset wages, the labour
union chooses the optimal wage so as to maximise household utility, subject to the
intermediate firm’s demand for each labour type.5 Hence, the problem of the labour
union is:
max
W˜t(j)
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βχw)
sßt+s
(
ct+s(j)
1−η
1− η −
nt+s(j)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
subject to:
ct+s(j) = (1− τn)W˜t(j)
Pt+s
nt+s(j) + X
nt+s(j) =
1
θkσ
(
W˜t(j)
Wkt+s
)−γk
nkt+s
where the first constraint is the household’s budget constraint, with irrelevant terms
subsumed in X.
As with prices, with ex-post symmetry, this gives the following forward-looking
expression for optimal wages:
W˜
(1+γkϕ)
kt =
γk
γk − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0(βχw)
sßt+sW
γk(1+ϕ)
kt+s
(
nkt+s
θkσ
)1+ϕ
Et
∑∞
s=0(βχw)
sßt+sλt+s(1− τn)wkt+sW (γk−1)kt+s (nkt+s/θkσ)
(1.8)
5Since the union maximises the household’s utility, this is equivalent to the formulation in EFR,
and is still optimal from the perspective of the household.
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1.2.4 Government
The government’s expenditures consist of purchases of domestic non-tradable goods,
gt, and lump-sum transfers, Tt, while revenues come from labour income taxes. The
government deficit, net of transfers, is therefore given by:
dt =
PNt
Pt
gt − τn(wTtnTt + wNtnNt)
The budget constraint is defined by:
RHt−1
pit
bGt + dt + σTt = bGt+1
To ensure stationarity of government debt, transfers respond to deviations of debt
from its steady state value, according to the rule:6
Tt = T
ρT
t−1
[
T
(
bGt
bG
)ρB](1−ρT )
Government consumption expenditures, as a ratio to GDP, react to deviations of
output from its steady state according to:7
gt
yt
=
(
gt−1
yt−1
)ρg [(g
y
)(
yt
y
)ρy](1−ρg)
1.2.5 Equilibrium
Risk-Sharing Notice that idiosyncratic shocks exist due to staggered wage-setting.
The existence of contingent assets that allow perfect risk-sharing between domestic
households is implicitly assumed, such that all consumption and savings decisions
are the same. This implies that the j index can be dropped from the household’s
first order conditions. Furthermore, each household holds a diversified portfolio of
shares in all domestic monopolistic firms. Therefore, the stochastic discount factor
of these firms, Λt,t+s, can be defined as the generic household’s price of transfering
one unit of consumption between time t to t+ s, and is given by:
Λt,t+s ≡ βsEtßt+s
ßt
λt+s
λt
6Variables without time subscripts denote the steady state values.
7In order to differentiate the impact of this fiscal stabilisation rule from the debt-targeting
transfers rule, in the remainder of the paper the deficit will be defined net of the deviations of
transfers from its steady state.
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Goods Market Clearing - Intermediate Goods Recall that the monopolistic
firms use one unit of the intermediate good to produce one unit of their differentiated
goods, such that:
xkt =
ˆ θk
0
ykt(i)di (1.9)
This gives a simple expression for the aggregate nominal profits of the monopo-
listic firms:
Πkt = Pktykt −MCktxkt
Plugging the demand schedule, (1.6), into equation (1.9) yields:
xkt = ykt∆kt
where the index of price dispersion is defined as:
∆kt ≡
ˆ θk
0
(
Pkt(i)
Pkt
)−k
di
Under the Calvo-pricing assumption, the price index can be written as:
Pkt =
[
(1− χp)(P˜kt)1−k + χp(Pkt−1)1−k
] 1
1−k
and this equation can be used to derive the law of motion of the price dispersion
index:
∆kt = χppi
k
kt∆kt−1 + (1− χp)P˜ kkt
where pikt ≡ Pkt/Pkt−1 is the inflation rate in sector k.
Goods Market Clearing - Final Goods Using the perfect risk-sharing assump-
tion to aggregate over households, the market clearing conditions in the tradable and
non-tradable sectors are given by:
yTt = σcHt + σ
∗c∗Ht
yNt = σcNt + gt
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Aggregate GDP is defined as:
yt = (PNtyNt + PTtyTt)/Pt
Asset Markets To ensure stationarity, the interest rate on foreign bond holdings
is assumed to be a function of the level of bond holdings. That is:
RFt = Rt exp
{
ψσ
bFt+1
yt
}
where Rt is the union’s common nominal risk free rate.
The aggregate household budget constraint, the budget constraint of the govern-
ment, the zero-profit condition of the intermediate goods producers and the final
good producers, yield the following law of motion for the foreign asset holdings
σbFt+1 = RFt−1σbFt + PTtσ∗c∗Ht − P ∗TtσcFt
where variables with an asterisk denote the Foreign counterparts. Market clearing
in the asset markets requires σbFt + σ
∗b∗Ft = 0.
1.2.6 Union-level Variables
The structure of the Foreign block is symmetric to that of Home block. The popu-
lation of the union is normalised to 1, so that σ∗ = (1 − σ). Union-wide GDP and
inflation rate are thus defined as
yUt = (yt)
σ(y∗t )
1−σ
piUt = (pit)
σ(pi∗t )
1−σ
Monetary Policy There is an independent monetary authority which follows a
Taylor rule targeting union-wide inflation, subject to a lower bound, Rlb. In partic-
ular, they set the interest rate according to:
Rt = max{Rlb, R
(
piUt
)ρpi}
1.2.7 Structural Reform
This framework gives rise to steady state prices that are a mark-up over marginal
costs, and steady state wages that are a mark-up over the household’s marginal
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rate of substitution between labour and consumption, as seen from the steady state
versions of the optimal price- and wage-setting equations, (1.7) and (1.8).
Pk =
k
k − 1P
x
k
wk =
γk
γk − 1
(nk/θkσ)
ϕ
(1− τn)λt
The size of these mark-ups is determined by the rates of substitution between inter-
mediate goods, k, and differentiated labour inputs, γk, respectively. These mark-ups
are interpreted as structural rigidities arising from excessive regulation.
EFR assume symmetry across the two blocks in the elasticities of substitution,
and induce excess rigidities in the non-tradable sector of the Home economy by
adding distortionary taxes on wages and prices in this sector. The structural reform
is then simulated as a reduction in these tax rates. Instead, in this paper, the
asymmetries in regulation are embedded into different elasticities of substitution,
and reform is simulated as a direct increase in these elasticities.
Although it may seem more natural to consider tax rates as policy instruments,
rather than deep parameters such as the elasticities of substitution, there are two
main considerations which lead to the alternative formulation in this paper. Firstly,
this formulation differentiates the effects of fiscal instruments, such as tax rates and
public expenditures, from the effects of excessive government regulation which gives
rise to structural rigidities. While this distinction was not important in the original
EFR paper, it becomes particularly important here since the focus is predominantly
on the interaction between these two types of macroeconomic policy.
Secondly, in micro-founded models that underlie this setup, government regula-
tions affect the mark-up by augmenting the elasticity of substitution. On the labour
side, in models such as Gnocchi (2009), where labour market rigidities are explicitly
modelled by centralisation of wage-setting, the degree of centralisation augments the
elasticity perceived by the non-atomistic labour union, which determines the mark-
up. Similarly, on the product market side, Bilbiie et al. (2012) build a framework
with endogenous firm entry in which, depending on the functional form of house-
hold preferences, the elasticity of demand for differentiated goods can depend on the
number of firms in the market, which in turn depends on the barriers to firm entry.8
8Lewis and Stevens (2015) use full-information methods to estimate this model, and find that the
effect of firm entry on price mark-ups plays a non-negligible role on inflation dynamics. Griffith and
Harisson (2004) also find empirical evidence of a reduction in price mark-ups following a reduction
in product market regulation.
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Hence, familiar structural reforms such as a reduction in the centralisation of
wage-setting, or the barriers to firm entry, induce a change in the mark-up which
can be mapped directly into a change in the relevant elasticities of substitution. This
has no implication for the steady state, since the elasticities only enter the steady
state equations through the mark-up. However, it could in principle have some
impact on the dynamics, particularly of inflation rates, since they enter the dynamic
price-setting equations outside of the mark-up term. Numerically, these differences
are negligible for the reforms considered here. Furthermore, allowing time-varying
elasticities of substitution could be problematic for the forward-looking price- and
wage-setting rules. However, for unanticipated changes, the forward-looking rules
are not affected dynamically.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Calibration
For the purpose of this section, the model is the calibrated as in EFR. For the fiscal
variables, values common in the literature are used. Table 1.1 shows some of the key
values used. Unless otherwise stated, parameters have the same value in the Home
and Foreign blocks, which are calibrated as the Periphery and Core of the Euro-area
respectively.
Table 1.2 summarises the baseline calibration of the structural rigidities. Wage
and price mark-ups are assumed to be equal in a given sector. The tradable sector
mark-up in both blocks is set to 15%, and the non-tradable sector mark-up in the
Core (Foreign) block to 33%. The non-tradable sector of the Periphery (Home) block
is assumed to face “excess” rigidities, here the initial elasticities are set to target a
mark-up of 50%.
1.3.2 Examining the Effects of Reform
Figure 1.1 shows the steady states of different variables for values of the non-tradable
mark-up ranging from 0 to 100%.
Panel a) shows the effect on relative prices. Increasing the non-tradable sector
mark-up increases the price of non-tradable goods both relative to the CPI, and
relative to the price of tradable goods. The upward pressure on prices means that
the real exchange rate, defined as P ∗/P , falls. This implies that, despite the fall in
domestic tradable sector prices relative to the CPI, the terms of trade, defined as
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Parameter Description Value
Preferences
β Discount Factor 0.99
η Inverse Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution 2
ϕ Inverse Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply 2
ξ Elasticity of Substitution Tradable/Non-tradable 0.5
θ Share of Non-tradables 0.6
φ Elasticity of Substitution Home/Foreign 1.5
α Share of Imported Goods 0.4
Price and Wage Rigidities
χp Price Stickiness 0.66
χw Wage Stickiness 0.66
Fiscal Policy
τn Labor Income Tax Rate 30%
g/y Government Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio 10%
d/y Government Deficit-to-GDP Ratio 3%
Union-level
σ Relative Block Size 0.5
ρpi Taylor rule parameter 10
Table 1.1: Parameter Values - Overview
p∗T/pT , falls slightly.
9
Increasing the wage mark-up and increasing the price mark-up will have two op-
posing effects on the non-tradable sector wage, pushing it up and down respectively.
Panel b) of Figure 1.1 shows that when increasing both mark-ups simultaneously, the
latter effect dominates and the wage falls. The combination of lower non-tradable
wages and a lower price in the tradable sector, lowers the tradable sector wage. This
wage falls as much as the non-tradable sector, meaning that the relative wage remains
effectively constant.
Panel c) shows the effect of this price- and wage-setting on employment, and hence
output. As expected, employment in the non-tradable sector falls as the mark-up
rises. Employment in the tradable sector also falls slightly, meaning that the share
of employment in the non-tradable sector falls slightly, and total output falls. With
a 50% mark-up, total output is almost 15% below the steady state with no mark-up.
9The terms of trade and the real exchange rate are both equal to 1 when there is symmetry
across the countries, namely when the Periphery non-tradable sector mark-up is equal to 33% as
in the Core.
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Target Description Target Value Parameter
Tradeable Sector Mark-up 1.15 T = γT = 7.7
Core Non-Tradeable Sector Mark-up 1.33 ∗N = γ
∗
N = 4
Periphery Non-Tradeable Sector Mark-up 1.50 N = γN = 3
Table 1.2: Parameter Values - Structural Rigidities
To show the effects of the mark-up on public finances, the steady state level of
lump sum transfers, T , is calibrated such that the steady state deficit-to-GDP ratio
at the baseline calibration with a 50% mark-up is equal to 3%. This level of T is then
held constant, and government expenditure is fixed at 10% of GDP. This means that
changing the mark-up affects the deficit-to-GDP through changes in tax revenues-
to-GDP and through the denominator effect on T/y. Panel d) of Figure 1.1 shows
that total tax revenue falls as a fraction of GDP, given the fall in both employment
and wages, while transfers as a fraction of GDP rise, as GDP falls. This implies
that the deficit-to-GDP ratio rises as the mark-up rises. In fact, for this calibration,
mark-ups below around 30% would imply a steady state government surplus, while
higher mark-ups can push the ratio up to around 7%.
Notice, also, that these effects are not linear: the same increase in the mark-
up when it is already very high is smaller than when it is low. In particular, the
non-linearity of the effects on wages and non-tradable employment feed into the tax
revenues-to-GDP, and hence the deficit-to-GDP rises less steeply as the mark-up
increases.
1.3.3 Comparison of Policy Scenarios
This section looks at the short run dynamics following a reform that reduces both
price and wage mark-ups in the non-tradable sector of the Periphery block by 1%.
The simulation is a deterministic transition from the initial pre-reform steady state
towards the new steady state with the lower mark-up.10
The reform is simulated under different assumptions regarding monetary and
fiscal policy. The purpose is to illustrate that a monetary expansion following a
reform is necessary for the reform to be expansionary in the short run; without this,
reforms reduce output for a few periods. Furthermore, when monetary policy is
constrained, active fiscal stabilisation can be used to mitigate the output losses.
10The transition is based on the fully non-linear solution to the model, and is implemented in
Dynare. The simulations are run for 200 periods.
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Figure 1.1: Comparative Statics
1.3.3.1 Structural Reforms under Constrained Monetary Policy
To start with, government spending is fixed at its steady state by setting ρy = 0,
and only monetary policy acts to stabilise the economy during the reform.
In order to replicate the results of EFR for the reform at the ZLB, a shock to ßt
is assumed to increase the stochastic discount factor and so push the interest rate
to Rlb = 1.0025. Column a) of Figure 1.2 shows the results of these simulations for
four key variables: Union-wide output and inflation, the common nominal interest
rate and the deficit-to-GDP ratio of the Periphery block.
The solid lines show the effects of reforms in normal times. The reform creates
deflationary pressure, which induces a monetary expansion, but the effect on output
is positive in every period. On the other hand, as seen in the dashed lines, reforms
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All responses are to a 1% reduction in mark-ups. Solid lines in both columns show the reform in normal times. Dashed
lines in the first column show the case where the nominal interest rate hits its lower bound, and, in the second column,
the case where the nominal interest rate is fixed at steady state. Dash-dotted lines show the difference between the
dashed and solid lines, and, for the interest rate and the deficit ratio, are shifted up by the steady state value for
ease of viewing. Y-axes show quarters.
Figure 1.2: Alternative Monetary Policy Scenarios
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implemented in the ZLB crisis are contractionary in the short run. While the short
run contraction in output is predominantly a result of the discount factor shock,
rather than the reform directly, this exercise highlights the fact that reforms imple-
mented when monetary policy cannot provide a demand expansion do not provide
the same boost to output in the short run. In other words, there is an interaction
between the reform and the ZLB shock, and a “na¨ıve” expectation that the effect of
the two together is the sum of the two effects is incorrect.
To further illustrate this point, the Column b) of Figure 1.2 shows the effect
of the reform under monetary policy which is exogenously fixed at its steady state
for a fixed length of time.11 The purpose of this exercise is to abstract from the
direct negative demand effects of the ZLB shock, at the same time neutralising the
effect of monetary policy, keeping it fixed without any additional expansionary or
contractionary effects. Importantly, in this exercise, all responses are directly due to
the reform: removing the reform would make all of these responses flat, which is not
the case for the simulations with the ZLB shock. The dashed lines show that even
without the direct effects of the discount factor shock, the reform is contractionary
in the short run when monetary policy is fixed. The dash-dotted lines show the
difference between the fixed and active monetary policy, showing the net effect of
fixed monetary policy.
The bottom row of each Column of Figure 1.2 shows the response of government
deficit-to-GDP ratios for the Periphery block. As shown in the previous section, the
reform reduces this ratio in the long run. Without any monetary policy constraint,
the ratio falls immediately after the reform. However, the ZLB crisis raises the deficit
in the short run, even absent a response of the fiscal instrument. This is partly due
to a shrinking of the tax base, but is predominantly a denominator effect from the
fall in output. Looking at the case with a fixed nominal interest rate, the deficit
ratio rises slightly on impact and falls to the new lower level more gradually. The
net effect of fixed monetary policy during the reform, shown in the dash-dotted lines,
is to raise the deficit-to-GDP ratio for almost 10 quarters.
1.3.3.2 Structural Reforms with Active Fiscal Policy
This section repeats the same reform simulations, this time allowing government
spending to respond by setting ρy < 0.
12
11In particular, the monetary policy rule is specified as Rt = ε
MPR + (1 − εMP )R (piUt )ρpiand
εMP , a white noise zero-mean process, is set equal to 1 for 10 periods.
12In particular, ρy = −200. This is a very large number but serves only to excentuate the
differences in the plots for ease of viewing.
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The two Columns of Figure 1.3 again show the two cases of constrained monetary
policy, comparing the cases with and without active fiscal policy.13 Column a) shows
that the fall in output during the ZLB crisis induces a fiscal expansion, which can
mitigate the deflationary pressures and thus mitigate the output losses in the short
run, as well as speeding up the recovery towards the new, higher level of output.
However, this comes at the cost of a larger and more persistent increase in the
deficit-to-GDP ratio. In fact, this remains above its pre-reform level even after 20
quarters.
Column b) shows the alternative exercise in which the nominal interest rate is
fixed at its steady state. Abstracting from the direct negative effects of the ZLB
shock, active fiscal policy can fully eliminate the short run output losses. In this
case, output is above the initial steady state in every period following the reform.
Again, the dash-dotted lines show the difference between the cases with and with-
out active fiscal policy, and hence capture the effect of the reform under constrained
monetary policy that is attributable to active fiscal stabilisation. In particular, ac-
tive fiscal policy implies the deficit-to-GDP ratio remains above the pre-reform steady
state for around 1 year after the reform, and above the baseline of no active policy
for almost 3 years before reaching the new lower steady state.
1.3.4 Quantitative Comparisons
The above analysis illustrated, somewhat qualitatively, the contractionary effects of
reforms implemented when monetary policy is constrained, and the potential for
active fiscal policy to offset the short run costs of reform. This section returns to the
underlying question of how large the fiscal costs and benefits of reforms are, and to
what extent the latter justify the former.
In this analysis, the value of ρy becomes important. In each simulation discussed
below, this parameter is set as the smallest integer, in absolute value, such that
Home output is above the initial steady state in every period following the reform.
This gives the “smallest” fiscal stimulus which fully offsets the output losses of the
reform.
To measure the size of this fiscal stimulus, referred to as the short run fiscal cost
of the reforms, it is necessary to abstract from the direct effects of the ZLB shock,
and isolate the additional effect of the active fiscal response. This means focusing
on the difference between the response of deficit-to-GDP under exogenously fixed
13There is effectively a form of “monetary dominance” and fiscal policy is not considered to be
active during normal times.
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a) ZLB Crisis (solid) vs. ZLB Crisis with b) Fixed MP (solid) vs. Fixed MP with
Active FP (dash) and Difference (dash-dot) Active FP (dash) and Difference (dash-dot)
G
D
P
(%
d
ev
fr
o
m
in
it
ia
l
ss
)
N
et
In
fl
at
io
n
R
a
te
(%
)
N
om
in
al
In
te
re
st
R
a
te
(a
n
n
u
al
is
ed
)
D
efi
ci
t-
to
-G
D
P
(%
)
All lines show a 1% reduction in mark-ups. The first column shows the case where the nominal interest rate hits
its lower bound, and the second column the case where the nominal interest rate is fixed at steady state. Solid
lines replicate the dashed lines in Figure 1.2 and dashed lines show the case where government spending responds to
deviations of output from steady state. Dash-dotted lines show the difference between the dash and solid lines, and
are shifted up by the steady state for the interest rate and deficit. Y-axes show quarters.
Figure 1.3: Alternative Fiscal Policy Scenarios
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monetary policy with and without active fiscal policy. In other words, focusing on
the dash-dotted lines in the second column of Figure 1.3, which will be referred to
as the “excess deficit”. Two summary statistics are extracted from this:
1. Cumulative excess deficit in transition This is the sum of the excess deficit
in each period that it is positive. This statistic is expressed as a ratio to the
pre-reform GDP, and captures the total size of the short run fiscal stimulus
following the reform.
2. Peak deficit-to-GDP deviation This is the largest value of the excess deficit-
to-GDP. This statistic captures the amount of fiscal space required to carry
out the stimulus, and will be useful for comparison against the provisions in
the SGP for deviations from imposed deficit targets.
The long run benefit to public finances is measured by comparing the pre- and
post-reform steady states of the model, looking in particular at:
3. Fall in steady state deficit-to-GDP This is the percentage point fall in deficit-
to-GDP at the post-reform steady state relative to the initial steady state.
Finally, the extent to which the long run improvement in steady state deficit-to-
GDP can justify the short run fiscal costs is quantified as:
4. Years to repay This is the number of years required at the new steady state,
such that the ‘excess surplus’, i.e. the lower deficit, adds up to the cumulative
excess deficit in transition, as defined above.
Excess Deficit Peak Deficit-to- Fall in steady state Years to Repay
in Transition GDP Deviation deficit-to-GDP
0.67% 0.23pp 0.15pp 1.22
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics Under Baseline Calibration
The values of these summary statistics under the baseline calibration are given in
Table 1.3. The long run gain from the reform is a 0.15pp improvement in the long run
deficit-to-GDP ratio. These numbers correspond to the lines in Figure 1.3, except
that here ρy = −10, which results in a fiscal stimulus with a total cost of 0.67%
of the pre-reform GDP. The peak deviation of deficit-to-GDP from the baseline is
0.23pp on impact. At the new lower steady state deficit-to-GDP, this cost can be
repaid in just over 1 year.
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Clearly, under the baseline reform scenario, the short run costs of carrying out a
fiscal expansion are not particularly large and are outweighed by the long run gains.
However, the precise numbers depend on the parameterisation of the model and the
reforms. This is investigated by looking at the sensitivity of these statistics along two
dimensions: firstly how they depend on the calibration of certain model parameters,
and secondly how they depend on the reform that is being simulated.
1.3.4.1 Sensitivity to Parameterisation
The summary statistics are computed for different values for the relative size of the
Home block, the initial level of the non-tradable sector mark-up, and the size of the
government, as captured by the government spending-to-GDP ratio. Table 1.4 shows
the different summary statistics.
Excess Deficit Peak Deficit-to- Fall in Steady Years to
in Transition GDP Deviation State Deficit Repay
Relative size of Home block
20% 0.20% 0.08pp 0.15pp 0.36
30% 0.53% 0.19pp 0.15pp 0.95
50% 0.67% 0.23pp 0.15pp 1.22
Initial Mark-up
33% 0.62% 0.21pp 0.18pp 0.91
50% 0.67% 0.23pp 0.15pp 1.22
60% 0.67% 0.23pp 0.13pp 1.37
Government Size
5% 0.61% 0.21pp 0.16pp 1.01
10% 0.67% 0.23pp 0.15pp 1.22
30% 0.88% 0.30pp 0.09pp 2.71
Table 1.4: Sensitivity of Summary Statistics to Parameterisation
Relative Country Size The first panel shows that for smaller countries, the short
run fiscal costs are lower. In fact, the value of ρy for the different country sizes is −4,
−8 and −10 respectively: the output costs of the reforms are smaller in each case,
such that a weaker fiscal response is needed to offset these costs. Since the long run
gains are equal, significantly less time to repay the short run costs. The fiscal space
required for a smaller country to carry out the reform, in terms of deviation from
the SGP objectives, is also much smaller.
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Initial Mark-up The second panel shows the results from varying the initial level
of mark-ups in the Periphery Non-tradable sector. These results show that both the
peak and the the cumulative deficit cost of the reform is slightly lower when the
initial level of rigidities are lower. Since the long run gain in deficit-to-GDP is also
higher, echoing the non-linearity observed in Figure 1.1, overall the trade-off is larger
when markets are initially more rigid, and the costs take longer to repay.
Size of Government The last panel shows the effect of different steady state
levels of government spending-to-GDP. In this case, when the government is larger,
the fiscal costs of the reform are higher and the long run gains are smaller. This
implies considerably longer time to repay: almost 3 years in the case of 30% steady
state government spending-to-GDP.
1.3.4.2 Reform Design
The final step of the analysis is to compare different reform scenarios, looking in
particular at the size of the reform and whether the reform is in price or wage mark-
ups, labelled product market reforms (PMR) and labour market reforms (LMR)
respectively. Table 1.5 shows the different summary statistics for these different
reforms.
Excess Deficit Peak Deficit-to- Fall in Steady Years to
in Transition GDP Deviation State Deficit Repay
Size of Reform
1% 0.67% 0.23pp 0.15pp 1.22
5% 3.13% 1.07pp 0.75pp 1.10
10% 5.70% 1.99pp 1.53pp 0.96
Type of Reform
LMR 0.13% 0.03pp 0.03pp 1.54
50-50 0.67% 0.23pp 0.15pp 1.22
PMR 0.62% 0.24pp 0.12pp 1.33
Table 1.5: Sensitivity of Summary Statistics to Reform Design
Reform Size The first panel shows the results from varying the size of the reform,
comparing the baseline scenario of 1% to 5% and 10% mark-up reductions. The
effects here are almost precisely linear, although the overall years to repay does fall
slightly. On the other hand, the larger reforms do imply larger deviations of deficit
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from steady state, with the 10% reform requiring a 2pp deviation of deficit-to-GDP.
However this is clearly justified by the equally larger long run gains.
Reform Type Finally, the second panel explores the possibility of carrying out
asymmetric reforms in product and labour markets. In particular, the symmetric
1% reduction in both price and wage mark-ups is compared against a 1% reduction
in either price or wage mark-ups. These results show that product market reforms
are much more costly than labour market reforms. However, a pure labour market
reform, while implying only negligible deviation from the steady state deficit-to-GDP,
also implies a very small gain in long run deficit-to-GDP. This is because while the
reform increases employment, it also reduces wages, and this has a negative effect on
the tax base. Accordingly, the trade-off between consolidation and reform is higher
for labour market reforms.
1.4 Cross-Country Comparisons
Having seen the qualitative effects of reforms under alternative monetary and fiscal
policy scenarios, and investigated quantitatively how these effects depend on the
model parameterisation, this section now uses this to inform a comparison of reform
scenarios for different countries. Specifically, the model is re-calibrated to represent
different countries in the Euro-area and look at the size of fiscal costs and benefits
from different reform scenarios.
1.4.1 Calibration
The entire economy is taken to be made up of the four largest Euro-area economies:
France, Germany, Italy and Spain. In accordance with the comparisons carried out
above, for each of France, Italy and Spain, the relative size of the Home country,
the steady state government deficit-to-GDP and expenditure-to-GDP ratios, and
the initial mark-up in both the tradable and non-tradable sector are re-calibrated.
In each case, the Foreign block is then calibrated to be the weighted average of the
remaining three countries. Table 1.6 summarises the values used; all other parameters
are kept at their baseline values.14
14The openness parameter, α, is altered in each case to remain just below the relative size of the
country. This is necessary to ensure a feasible steady state is found.
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Country Deficit-to-GDP, Government Tradable Non-tradable
Country size, σ d/y size, g/y Mark-up Mark-up
France 30% 4% 25% 12% 26%
Germany 35% -1.7% 20% 13% 25%
Italy 20% 3.5% 20% 15% 38%
Spain 15% 5% 20% 14% 40%
Note: Country size based on relative GDP. Government size given by final consumption expenditure
of general government. All data come from Eurostat and refer to averages 2004-2013, except the
estimates of mark-ups, which are taken from Hoj et al. (2007). For Spain, for which data is unavailable,
the OECD’s Product Market Regulation Index is used, and mark-ups are set at a slightly higher mark-
up level than Italy. Hoj et al. (2007) show that their estimates are significantly correlated with this
index.
Table 1.6: Calibration for Different Countries
1.4.2 Baseline Dynamics
Figure 1.4 shows the dynamics of output and deficit-to-GDP following the baseline
1% reform in both price and wage mark-ups.
The reform implemented in France entails the largest fall in output in the short
run, as well as the largest gains in the long run. Accordingly, the gain from a
fiscal expansion during the reform are also larger. The costs of active fiscal policy
are slightly larger than the other two countries: at the peak, there is just over 0.1pp
deviation from the baseline deficit-to-GDP ratio, and the excess deficit-to-GDP takes
around 2 years to disappear. The gain in the deficit ratio in the long run is also just
over 0.1pp.
The reform in Italy has smaller negative effects in the short run, since it is a
smaller country, and accordingly a smaller fiscal stimulus is needed, while the long-
run gain in deficit-to-GDP is only slightly lower than in France. Finally, in Spain,
the smallest country in this group, the reform has negligible and very short lived
output costs, and so the necessary fiscal stimulus is much smaller, and disappears
slightly faster, with the deficit-to-GDP ratio reaching the new steady state, which is
again just over 0.1pp lower, after around 6 quarters.
1.4.3 Alternative Reforms
Finally, the summary statistics, introduced above, are shown for each country for
different reform scenarios. In particular, the baseline reform is compared to a larger
reform of a 5% reduction in price and wage mark-ups, and to 1% reductions in the
price and wage mark-up separately.
The results are shown in Table 1.7, which also shows the long run gain in output
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Figure 1.4: Baseline Reforms in Different Countries
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for each reform, as a percentage of the pre-reform steady state. The output gains
from reform in Italy and Spain are not much larger than France, although they start
at higher mark-up levels. The long run gain from PMR and LMR are identical in
each case, and, despite potential interaction effects through price- and wage-setting,
the effect of the baseline reform in both markets is the sum of the two effects. The
output effects of the larger reform scenario are, again, broadly linear.
Gain in Steady Excess Peak Deficit-to- Fall in Steady Years to
State Output Deficit GDP Deviation State Deficit Repay
France
Baseline Reform 0.26% 0.31% 0.12pp 0.13pp 0.65
Larger Reform 1.31% 1.49% 0.57pp 0.66pp 0.60
LMR Only 0.13% 0.15% 0.03pp 0.01pp 36.77
PMR Only 0.13% 0.18% 0.09pp 0.12pp 0.37
Italy
Baseline Reform 0.24% 0.19% 0.08pp 0.11pp 0.46
Larger Reform 1.20% 0.93% 0.38pp 0.57pp 0.44
LMR Only 0.12% 0.18% 0.04pp 0.01pp 7.77
PMR Only 0.12% 0.06% 0.04pp 0.10pp 0.16
Spain
Baseline Reform 0.25% 0.10% 0.04pp 0.11pp 0.24
Larger Reform 1.29% 0.48% 0.20pp 0.57pp 0.24
LMR Only 0.13% 0.11% 0.02pp 0.01pp 4.37
PMR Only 0.13% 0.00% 0.00pp 0.10pp 0.00
Table 1.7: Alternative Reform Design in Different Countries
In terms of fiscal costs, in the case of France the baseline reform entails a short
run fiscal cost of 0.31% of the pre-reform GDP, and a long run gain of 0.13pp in the
deficit-to-GDP ratio. At its peak, the fiscal stimulus requires a 0.12pp increase in the
deficit-to-GDP ratio. The costs of this reform can be repaid in just over 2 quarters at
the new steady state. As before, increasing the size of the reform increases the short
run costs and long run benefits in a linear fashion, and so the time to repay the costs
is about the same. The peak deficit-to-GDP deviation remains modest at 0.66pp.
Again the labour market reforms entail almost no increase in the long run deficit-to-
GDP ratio, and so the short run costs are unfeasible to repay. On the other hand,
while the pure product market reform has a slightly larger fiscal cost than the labour
market reform, it achieves a sizeable long run gain in the deficit-to-GDP ratio, close
to the gain from the baseline reform. Hence this reform is much more self-financing,
and the costs can be repaid in just over one quarter.
There is a similar picture for Italy. Here the short run costs of all reform scenarios
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are smaller, because of the smaller size of the country, while the long run gains are
a similar size. Hence the costs can be repaid even faster than the case of France.
Again, increasing the size of the reform does not affect this time to repay, but still
does not require a larger deviation in deficit-to-GDP, with a peak value of 0.57pp.
Once again, labour market reforms are unfeasible as they effectively do not improve
the long run deficit-to-GDP level, while pure product market reforms are much less
costly and can be repaid, in this case in well below 1 quarter.
Last but not least, the case of Spain again shows a similar pattern with respect
to the different reform scenarios. What is particularly interesting here is that the
pure product market reform actually does not require any fiscal stimulus: even with
constrained monetary policy, the country is sufficiently small that the reform is not
contractionary in the short run.
1.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In the current climate with constrained monetary policy in the Euro-area, policy
makers have been discussing the role of fiscal policy in offsetting the short run costs
of structural reforms. In order to understand whether a government should invest
time and public expenditure on the costs of structural reforms, it is important to
compare the potential short run costs to the effects of those reforms on public finances
in the long run. In particular, reforms which boost economic growth can improve
the fiscal balance in the long run, and so be self-financing.
This paper used the framework of Eggertsson et al. (2014) to show that that
reforms implemented when monetary policy is constrained are contractionary in the
short run. Furthermore, the fall in output also leads to a rise in the deficit-to-GDP
ratio during the reform, even absent any active fiscal stabilisation, before this ratio
reaches a lower post-reform steady state. An active fiscal stimulus can offset the
short run output costs of reform, but will lead to an additional rise in the deficit,
which captures the fiscal cost of the reform under constrained monetary policy.
The costs and benefits from the reforms depend on the size of the block im-
plementing the reform, with a larger size implying both higher costs and higher
benefits, such that the tradeoff is relatively stable. Countries with a higher initial
level of non-tradable mark-up, or a higher steady state level of government spending-
to-GDP, can expect lower long run gains from implementing the same reform, such
that the short run costs are harder to justify. The long run gains are obtained pre-
dominantly from the reduction in price mark-ups, while labour market reforms aimed
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at reducing wage mark-ups entail negligible long run gains in deficit-to-GDP. This
can either be interpreted to mean that the short run fiscal costs of labour market
reforms are not justified by their long run gains, or that labour market reforms need
to be complemented with product market reforms.
The analysis in this paper focused on the primary deficit as the measure of public
finances. However, some of the countries facing the highest need for reforms also faced
particularly high borrowing costs throughout the crisis, increasing the costs of fiscal
stimulus. Indeed, while this paper considered the SGP as the main fiscal constraint
facing Euro-area countries, country risk premia can be considered as market-imposed
fiscal constraints, and can be looked at in analogous way. In particular, during a fiscal
crisis when spreads are high, not only are borrowing costs high, the market may react
negatively to any sign of a lack of fiscal restraint. On the other hand, if fiscal stimulus
is accompanied by structural reforms, fiscal expansion should not be considered as a
sign of unsustainable debt in the long run.
Two further potentially interesting extensions present themselves. Firstly, con-
sidering alternative fiscal instruments could produce very different effects. This is
true for both the debt-targeting fiscal rule and the fiscal stabilisation rule. As the
former rule is not of interest in itself in this paper, and is only used to ensure deter-
minacy of public debt, lump-sum transfers are the natural policy instrument to keep
this neutral. However, considering alternative instruments for this rule is non-trivial
in this setting, firstly because it acts as a destabilising rule. Hence if government
consumption expenditures are used here, this would interfere with the fiscal stabil-
isation. At the same time, if distortionary taxes were used, for either of the fiscal
rules, this would interfere with the reform process. Both labour income and con-
sumption taxes are effectively a part of the wage and price mark-ups, respectively.
Hence raising or reducing these tax rates during a reform would act like reducing
or amplifying the reform itself. In terms of stabilisation, while a tax-based stimulus
could offset the effects of the reform, the reduction in the tax rates would imply a
further reduction in the mark-up, which could amplify the effects of the reform.
Finally, it would be interesting to introduce capital into the model. On the one
hand, the existence capital can change the effects of the discount factor shock on the
macro-economy: an increased desire to save can be channeled towards investment,
thereby boosting aggregate demand. Structural reforms will also have a similar
effect in the presence of capital, as the expectation of higher future productivity will
increase investment and mitigate the short run contractionary effects of the reform.
On the other hand, this would rely on a functioning financial intermediation sector.
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In the presence of financial frictions, this could increase the desirability of targeted
fiscal spending to alleviate credit constraints and so bring forward the long run effects
of the reform. These extensions are left for future research.
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Abstract
Cross-country evidence highlights the importance of tax evasion and corruption
in determining the size of fiscal multipliers. We introduce these two features
in a New Keynesian model and revisit the effects of fiscal consolidations. VAR
evidence for Italy suggests that spending cuts reduce tax evasion, while tax
hikes increase it. In the model, spending cuts induce a reallocation of produc-
tion towards the formal sector, thus reducing tax evasion. Tax hikes increase
the incentives to produce in the less productive shadow sector, implying higher
output and unemployment losses. Corruption further amplifies these losses by
requiring larger hikes in taxes to reduce debt. We use the model to assess
the recent fiscal consolidation plans in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Our
results corroborate the evidence of increasing levels of tax evasion during these
consolidations and point to significant output and welfare losses, which could
be reduced substantially by combating tax evasion and corruption.
2.1 Introduction
When there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the
same amount of income. Plato, The Republic, Book I, 343-D
The recent fiscal crisis has sparked a considerable amount of research measuring
the macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidations.1 This literature, however, has
left aside two crucial political economy aspects, namely the presence of tax evasion
and corruption. This is surprising, given that they are important features in many
of the countries adopting consolidation policies, as seen in Figure 2.1. In addition,
there is growing evidence that tax evasion and corruption have increased in recent
years. For example, a recent report by the technical staff of the Spanish Finance
Ministry (Gestha, 2014) indicates that the shadow economy in Spain increased by
6.8 percentage points between 2008 and 2012, reaching 24.6% of GDP. At the same
time, a special Greek police task force reported in 2013 that the number of cases of
public corruption increased by 33% between 2011 and 2012.2 The aim of this paper
is to revisit the effects of government expenditure cuts and labor tax hikes on output,
unemployment and welfare, when tax evasion and corruption are present.
We treat tax evasion as synonymous with the shadow economy, which, according
to Buehn and Schneider (2012, p.175-176), comprises “all market-based, lawful pro-
duction or trade of goods and services deliberately concealed from public authorities
in order to evade either payment of income, value added or other taxes, or social
security contributions”. Fiscal policy has an impact on the size of the shadow econ-
omy since it affects the incentives to tax evade both directly, through the tax burden,
and indirectly, through its effects on the formal economy. Thus, a fiscal consolida-
tion can have important secondary effects if it generates a reallocation of resources
between the formal and informal sectors.3 Corruption, in our paper, refers to the
embezzlement of public funds. The presence of corruption can hamper the ability of
the government to raise revenue, and thus distort the effects of fiscal consolidations.
Tax evasion and corruption often coexist and possibly interact. For instance, Buehn
and Schneider (2012) indicate that there is a positive correlation between the two.
1The implementation of the Maastricht Treaty in the mid 1990s initiated a wave of research on
the effects of consolidations. For examples, see the survey in Perotti (1996).
2See http://greece.greekreporter.com/2013/04/02/greek-police-public-worker-corruption-soars/
3For example, using a model calibrated to firm-level data for Greece, Pappada` and Zylberberg
(2014) show that the increase in tax evasion can explain three quarters of the revenue leakages
following the 2010 VAT hikes, when only half of the expected increase in revenue was realized.
Colombo et al. (2014) also show empirical evidence of a rise in the shadow economy in recent years,
although their focus is on the role of the banking crisis.
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Figure 2.1: Shadow Economy and Corruption in European Countries
Shadow Economy (% GDP), Average over 1999-2010
Source: Schneider and Buehn (2012).
Control of Corruption Index, Average over 1998-2010
Source: World Bank Global Governance Indicators.
Note: The dotted line indicates the average for the countries considered.
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Many authors have studied whether it is preferable to rely on spending cuts
or tax hikes when consolidating the public deficit. Overall, the findings are not
conclusive. Using multi-year fiscal consolidation data for 17 OECD countries over
the period 1980-2005, Alesina et al. (2013) show that expenditure-based adjustments
are typically associated with mild and short-lived recessions, and in some cases with
no recession at all, while tax-based corrections are followed by deep and prolonged
recessions. On the other hand, Erceg and Linde´ (2013) reach a different conclusion.
Using a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model of a
currency union, they show that, in the short run, a spending cut depresses output
by more than a labor tax hike, because of the limited accommodation by the central
bank and the fixed exchange rate. However, this is reversed in the long run as real
interest and exchange rates adjust towards their flexible price levels.
Indeed, there is strong evidence that the effects of fiscal consolidations are not
yet fully understood. Blanchard and Leigh (2013) examine the impact of the recent
fiscal consolidations in 26 OECD countries. They regress the forecast errors of output
growth between 2010-2011 on the planned consolidation of public deficit, and find
that the forecasts underestimate the size of fiscal multipliers. As shown in the next
section, the underestimation of fiscal multipliers is more pronounced in countries with
a higher level of tax evasion and/or corruption, suggesting that these two features
amplify the effects of fiscal consolidations.
Reliable time series data on tax evasion is typically hard to get. Luckily, the
Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) has created and regularly updated a
time series of informal employment in Italy, which is consistent with international
standards and, in particular, with the 1993 System of National Accounts. Apart
from data availability, Italy is a fitting case for studying tax evasion and corruption.
Firstly, there is abundant evidence of a large shadow economy, with estimates varying
between 15% and 30% of GDP (see e.g. Ardizzi et al., 2012, Orsi et al., 2014, and
Schneider and Buehn, 2012). Secondly, Busato and Chiarini (2004) have shown
that incorporating the shadow economy in an RBC model for Italy considerably
improves the fit to the data. Thirdly, Italy scores poorly in international rankings of
institutional quality: it is currently ranked 72nd among 176 countries with a score of
42/100 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and 25th among
the 27 EU members in the index for the ‘Quality of Government’ (see Charron et
al., 2012).4
4The Corruption Perception Index is based on a cross-country survey assessing the degree of
transparency in public administration. The ‘Quality of Government’ index accounts for other pillars,
such as protection of the rule of law, government effectiveness and accountability, in addition to
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In the first part of this paper, we incorporate the ISTAT series on informal em-
ployment in a VAR, and identify the effects of fiscal consolidations occurring through
a fall in government consumption expenditure or an increase in direct taxes. We find
that both types of shocks are contractionary, both reducing output and increasing
unemployment. However, tax hikes significantly increase informal employment, while
spending cuts reduce it.
To understand the mechanisms driving the results, we reassess the effects of
fiscal consolidations in a model with price stickiness, search and matching frictions,
endogenous labor force participation, tax evasion and corruption. The economy
features a regular and an informal sector, and the transactions in the latter sector
are not recorded by the government. Firms can hire informal labor to hide part
of their production and evade payroll taxes. Households may also evade personal
income taxation by reallocating their labor to the informal sector. In each period,
there is a positive probability that irregular employment is detected, in which case
the worker loses the job and the firm pays a fine. Corruption implies that a fraction
of tax revenues is embezzled. Following Erceg and Linde´ (2013), either labor tax
rates or government consumption expenditures react to the deviation of the debt-to-
GDP ratio from a target value. Fiscal consolidation occurs when this target is hit
by a negative shock.
We find that the presence of tax evasion and corruption amplifies the negative
effects of labor tax hikes on output and unemployment, while it mitigates those of
expenditure cuts. Tax evasion and corruption imply that a larger increase in the
tax rate is needed to reduce debt, and this amplifies the distortionary effects of the
consolidation. Tax evasion further increases the output losses after a tax hike because
workers and firms reallocate resources to the informal sector, increasing inefficiencies
since this sector is less productive.
On the other hand, government spending cuts reduce tax evasion. The spending
cut creates a positive wealth effect which increases consumption and investment and
reduces labor force participation. Agents reallocate their labor search towards the
formal sector, first because it is more productive, and second because the formal labor
market has a higher matching efficiency and a lower job destruction rate. Hence, the
share of shadow employment in total employment is reduced. Relative to standard
models, tax evasion and corruption increase the size of this wealth effect, thereby
increasing the crowding-in of private consumption, and reducing output losses.
Labor tax hikes are costly in terms of welfare, but spending cuts typically involve
corruption.
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welfare gains, since private consumption increases and labor supply decreases. The
latter result is reversed, however, if government spending directly enters the utility
of households, or if agents are liquidity constrained.
We use our model to compare the recent consolidation policies in Greece, Italy,
Spain and Portugal, all countries that are characterized by both high corruption and
tax evasion. Despite the fact that the consolidation plans rely heavily on spending
cuts, the model predicts increasing levels of tax evasion in all countries, as well as
prolonged recessions. The largest output losses are observed in Portugal, due to
the size of the tax hikes, and Greece, due to the severity of the austerity measures.
There are also substantial welfare losses in all countries; the largest occurs in Portugal
because of the significant tax hikes in the consolidation package.
There have been considerable discussions in the policy arena about combating
both tax evasion and corruption. For example, members of the European Parliament
organized an event focusing on corruption and tax evasion in Ljubljana in May 2013.
The issue of reducing tax evasion also dominated the 2013 meeting of G8 leaders. To
quantitatively evaluate the welfare gains from fighting tax evasion and corruption,
we perform a counterfactual analysis of the consolidation plans when we reduce the
degree of corruption and tax evasion. We find that both battles are worth fighting
as they significantly reduce the welfare losses from fiscal consolidation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present
empirical evidence to motivate our work. In Section 2.3 we develop the model and its
calibration. Section 2.4 discusses the main theoretical results. Section 2.5 presents
the policy comparisons and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
This section is divided into two parts. We first present evidence highlighting the
importance of corruption and tax evasion in determining the size of fiscal multipli-
ers. Here, we extend the cross-country regressions of Blanchard and Leigh (2013),
henceforth BL (2013), controlling for tax evasion and public corruption, and we
check the robustness of our conclusions by considering the output effects of narrative
consolidation shocks. We then use the ISTAT data on shadow employment to run
VAR regressions examining the effects of spending cuts and tax hikes on output,
unemployment and shadow employment in Italy.
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2.2.1 Do Tax Evasion and Corruption Matter?
To motivate our study, we replicate the BL (2013) regressions, controlling for tax
evasion and public corruption. As a proxy for tax evasion we use the estimates of the
share of shadow output to total GDP provided by Elgin and O¨ztunalı (2012), while
for corruption we use the Corruption Perception Index. We group the 26 European
countries considered by BL (2013) into either high and low tax evasion, or high and
low corruption.5 We then add to the BL (2013) regressions a dummy which is equal
to one for the high corruption or tax evasion group. We also run the same regression
using a dummy for both high corruption and tax evasion; in this case we drop three
countries which do not fall into the same group across the two indices.6
The results are shown in Table 2.1. The first column replicates the findings of
BL (2013). The planned fiscal consolidation variable is significant at 1% and has a
coefficient of -1.095, implying that “for every additional percentage point of fiscal
consolidation as a percentage of GDP, output was 1 percent lower than forecast”
(BL, 2013, p.8). Thus, fiscal multipliers are underestimated. Columns 2 to 4 show
the results when we include the interaction of the planned fiscal consolidation variable
with our dummies for high tax evasion and corruption. While the coefficient is still
significant at 5% when the dummy variables are included, it is lower in absolute
value. On the other hand, the interaction term is always significant, showing that
there is a significant difference in the coefficients between the two groups. Our
estimates imply that the coefficient on the planned fiscal consolidation is -1.431
for the high tax evasion group, -1.540 for the high corruption group, and -1.518
for the high tax evasion and corruption group. In all cases, they are larger, in
absolute value, than the baseline results of BL (2013), indicating that the implicit
underestimation of fiscal multipliers is more pronounced in countries with higher tax
evasion and/or corruption. In other words, these two features amplify the effects of
5We use a two-mean clustering algorithm to endogenously group the countries. The result-
ing ‘high tax evasion’ group comprises Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain, while the ‘low tax evasion’ group includes Austria,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Slovakia and the UK. The ‘high corruption’ group comprises Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
and Spain, while the ‘low corruption’ group includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.
6An alternative way of carrying out this analysis would be to include the indices as controls in
the regression. We have chosen to use the dummy variable approach because, although we have
robust groupings of countries in terms of high and low tax evasion and corruption, there is not
enough cross-sectional variation in either index to add them directly in the regression, and also
to avoid issues of generated regressor bias, since both measures are estimates of the underlying
variables of interest.
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fiscal consolidations.
The BL (2013) methodology has been criticized in a number of ways. Of particu-
lar importance for our study is the fact that the regression may not truly capture the
effect of fiscal multipliers on forecast errors. Given that the forecasts are conditional
not only on fiscal shocks but on the full set of information used by the forecaster,
forecast errors may depend on factors other than underestimated fiscal multipliers.
In order to check whether the results we obtain are due to the particular method-
ology of BL (2013), we perform a different exercise using the narrative fiscal consol-
idation episodes identified by Devries et al. (2011) for a group of OECD countries.
As above, we separate the sample of countries into high and low tax evasion and
high and low corruption groups.7 We then calculate the output responses to both
expenditure-based and tax-based consolidations for each group by estimating an em-
pirical model similar to Alesina et al. (2013). The results are shown in Figure 2.2.
Tax evasion and corruption do not appear to significantly affect the response of out-
put to expenditure-based consolidations, although the high tax evasion group has
slightly lower output losses in the long run. In the case of tax-based consolidations,
the output effects for high tax evasion and corruption countries are lower on impact,
but significantly larger and more prolonged in the medium and long run. Hence,
even with this alternative methodology, we find that tax evasion and corruption af-
fect the size of fiscal multipliers, and amplify the output losses from tax adjustments
in particular.
There is an important caveat to the exercises we have shown above, specifically
that we could be omitting other factors which are common across the groups. In
other words, the effects which we capture could be driven by other country charac-
teristics that are correlated with tax evasion and corruption. To address this issue,
we have attempted to control for several of the potential omitted factors. Columns
5 to 9 of Table 2.1 show the results of the BL (2013) regressions controlling for: i)
sophistication of financial systems, ii) degree of slack in the economy, iii) size of the
fiscal consolidation, iv) level of sovereign debt and v) level of sovereign risk.8 We
see that none of these controls can explain the results we had previously found. We
have also carried out the same robustness checks for the second exercise shown above
7In this case, the ‘high tax evasion’ group consists of Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
Spain, whilst the ‘low tax evasion’ group consists of Australia, Austria, France, the UK and the
US. The ‘high corruption’ group consists of France, Italy, Japan, Portugal and Spain, and the ‘low
corruption’ group consists of Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
8These are measured by i) the household debt-to-income ratio, ii) the unemployment rate, iii)
the reduction in the structural deficit, where, following Alesina and Ardagna (2010), a consolidation
is large if the deficit was reduced by more than 1.5% GDP, iv) the government debt-to-GDP level
and v) the sovereign credit default swap spread, respectively.
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Figure 2.2: Output Responses to Narrative Consolidation Episodes
(a) High and Low Tax Evasion Groups
(b) High and Low Corruption Groups
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using the narrative fiscal consolidation episodes, and again we do not find that any of
these controls can account for the differences we observe between countries with high
and low tax evasion and corruption.9 Whilst we cannot make causal statements from
these results, we can clearly see that countries with high tax evasion or corruption
have higher fiscal multipliers, and that this is not driven by five of the most likely
potential omitted factors.
We also run regressions for the components of GDP, and for unemployment, to
understand which variables are more significantly affected by the presence of these
two features. The results are shown in the online appendix.10 We find that the
presence of corruption and tax evasion is particularly important for the effects of
consolidations on the unemployment rate and investment, but not for consumption,
exports or imports.
2.2.2 Do Fiscal Consolidations Affect Tax Evasion?
The Italian statistical office provides estimates of the number of employees working
in the informal sector using the discrepancies between reported employment from
household surveys and firm surveys (see ISTAT, 2010). We use the share of informal
workers in total workers as a measure of the size of the shadow economy, and enter
this variable into a VAR to ascertain the effect of fiscal consolidations using different
instruments.
To identify the effects of unexpected spending cuts, we run a VAR with GDP (or
the unemployment rate), government final consumption expenditures, government
debt and the share of informal workers in total workers as endogenous variables, and
tax revenues as an exogenous variable. We use sign restrictions to identify a negative
shock to government expenditure which lasts for 3 periods, and reduces debt with a
lag. To identify the effects of unexpected labor tax hikes, we run a similar VAR which
includes direct tax revenues as an endogenous variable and government expenditures
as an exogenous control. We again use sign restrictions to identify a positive shock
to tax revenues, lasting 3 periods, which reduces debt with a lag. The responses of
all other variables are left unrestricted. The sign restrictions used are summarized
in Table 2.2.
We use annual data from 1980-2006. Except for the ISTAT series, all data is taken
from the AMECO database of the European Commission.11 All fiscal variables are
9These results are available from the authors upon request.
10The online appendix is available at: http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Pappa/
11The ISTAT data is available from http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/39522.
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Table 2.2: Baseline Sign Restrictions
Variable: Govt Expenditure Tax Revenue Debt
Shock: t = 0, 1, 2 t = 0, 1, 2 t = 1, 2, 3
Spending Cut – n/a –
Tax Hike n/a + –
expressed as a ratio to GDP, and we include time trends and dummies for the start
of the European Monetary Union, and for the mid-90s since there is a break in the
debt series. We include one lag in the VAR, and also include interest rates as an
exogenous variable in order to control for the effects of monetary policy. Given the
small sample size, we estimate the VAR with Bayesian methods and present 68%
posterior confidence bands.
The first panel of Figure 2.3 shows the resulting IRFs for the spending shocks, and
Figure 2.4 shows the results for the tax shock.12 After an expenditure cut, output
decreases significantly at all horizons, while shadow employment falls significantly
on impact. Following a tax hike, output does not fall on impact but the response
is significantly negative in the medium run, and there is a significant rise in shadow
employment on impact. When the unemployment rate is used instead of output, we
see that it rises significantly after both types of consolidation.
The correct identification of fiscal shocks is highly contested in the literature,
and there are justifiable concerns regarding the robustness of VAR results to differ-
ent identification schemes. To demonstrate the robustness of our qualitative results,
we examine their sensitivity to alternative identification schemes. The second panel
of Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present responses when we use an alternative set of sign re-
strictions in which we jointly identify spending cuts and tax hikes in the same VAR
regression, by assuming that they are uncorrelated. The final panel presents results
when we use a simple Cholesky decomposition to identify the shocks, ordering gov-
ernment spending and tax revenues first in the system. Whilst the precise pattern of
the responses can differ, the result broadly remains that consolidations are contrac-
tionary, and that spending-based consolidations reduce tax evasion whilst tax-based
consolidations increase it. Since the zero restrictions imposed in both the alternative
sign restrictions and the Cholesky are unlikely to hold in annual data, and we are
12For ease of exposition we show only the responses of the unrestricted variables in each case,
and show only the shadow employment response in the VAR specification with GDP; the other
responses are in line with the sign restrictions imposed, and the response of shadow employment is
similar in all cases. The full results are presented in the online appendix.
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Figure 2.3: Empirical IRFs - Expenditure Shock
GDP Shadow Employment Unemployment Rate
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Figure 2.4: Empirical IRFs - Tax Shock
GDP Shadow Employment Unemployment Rate
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Table 2.3: Anticipated Shocks
Dependent Variable: VAR Expenditure Shocks
REGRESSOR 1 2
‘Raw’ Professional 0.006
Forecast Errors (0.005)
‘Purified’ Professional -.001
Forecast Errors (0.005)
Constant 0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.004)
R-squared 0.091 0.002
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗p ≤ 0.1
restricted to using annual data due to the availability of data on shadow employment,
we feel that our baseline sign restrictions are the most valid choice.13
Another potential problem with the SVAR methodology is whether the shocks
we have identified can be anticipated. Dealing comprehensively with this issue is not
straightforward, and is beyond the scope of this paper. As a first pass at ascertaining
whether the shocks we have identified are truly unanticipated, we follow Perotti
(2005) and regress the spending shocks, identified in our baseline sign restrictions,
on forecast errors from professional forecasts of government expenditure, taken from
the ECB’s survey of professional forecasts. The first column of Table 2.3 shows the
results from regressions using the “raw” forecast errors, and the second column shows
the results using the residuals after regressing the forecast errors on the lag of the 4
variables in the VAR. We see that in both cases, the forecast errors are uncorrelated
to our shocks, suggesting that our shocks are not predictable.
Thus the data robustly suggests that fiscal consolidation through expenditure
cuts leads to a fall in shadow employment, while a consolidation through tax hikes
increases shadow employment, and that both types of consolidations are contrac-
tionary. In the next section we develop a model with tax evasion and corruption to
replicate these findings and understand how these frictions affect the propagation of
13We have also used the narrative fiscal consolidation episodes identified by Devries et al. (2011),
however, given that they provide very few episodes for Italy alone, we do not find significant
responses. Further details of all these exercises are provided in the online appendix.
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fiscal shocks.
2.3 The Model
We construct a DSGE model featuring search and matching frictions, endogenous
labor decisions, and sticky prices in the short run. Since, in Section 2.2, we found
that corruption and tax evasion are not important for the effects of fiscal consoli-
dation on exports or imports, we consider a closed economy. There are two types
of firms in the economy: (i) competitive firms that produce intermediate goods in
either the formal or informal sector, and (ii) monopolistic retailers that use all in-
termediate varieties to produce differentiated retail goods, which are then costlessly
aggregated into a final consumption good. Price rigidities arise at the retail level,
while labor market frictions occur in the production of intermediate goods. Interme-
diate firms can choose to produce in the informal sector in order to evade the payroll
taxes paid on formal employment. In each period, they face a probability of being
inspected by the fiscal authorities and convicted of tax evasion, in which case they
pay a penalty, and the employment match is terminated. There is a representative
household consisting of formal and informal employees, unemployed jobseekers and
labor force non-participants. Jobseekers can choose to search in the informal sector
in order to evade income taxes. The household rents out its private capital to the
intermediate firms, and purchases the final consumption good. The government col-
lects taxes from the regular sector, embezzles a fraction of the revenues, and uses
the remainder to finance public expenditures and the provision of unemployment
benefits.
2.3.1 Labor markets
We account for the imperfections and transaction costs in the labor market by as-
suming that jobs are created through a matching function. For j = F, I denoting
the formal and informal sectors, let υjt be the number of vacancies and u
j
t the number
of jobseekers in each sector. We assume matching functions of the form:
mjt = µ
j
1(υ
j
t )
µ2(ujt)
1−µ2 (2.1)
where we allow for differences in the efficiency of the matching process, µj1, in the
two sectors. In each sector we can define the probability of a jobseeker being hired,
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ψhjt , and of a vacancy being filled, ψ
fj
t , as follows:
ψhjt ≡
mjt
ujt
, ψfjt ≡
mjt
υjt
In each period, jobs in the formal sector are destroyed at a constant fraction, σF ,
and mFt new matches are formed. The law of motion of formal employment, n
F
t , is
thus given by:
nFt+1 = (1− σF )nFt +mFt (2.2)
In the informal sector there is an exogenous fraction of jobs destroyed in each period,
σI , as well as a probability, ρ, that an informal employee loses their job due to an
audit. The law of motion of informal employment, nIt , is given by:
nIt+1 = (1− ρ− σI)nIt +mIt (2.3)
2.3.2 Households
The representative household consists of a continuum of infinitely lived agents. The
members of the household derive utility from leisure, which corresponds to the frac-
tion of members that are out of the labor force, lt, and a consumption bundle, cct,
defined as:
cct = [α1(ct)
α2 + (1− α1)(gt)α2 ]
1
α2
where gt denotes public consumption, taken as exogenous by the household, and ct is
private consumption. The elasticity of substitution between the private and public
goods is given by 1
1−α2 .
14 The instantaneous utility function is given by:
U(cct, lt) =
cc1−ηt
1− η + Φ
l1−ϕt
1− ϕ
where η is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, Φ > 0 is the
relative preference for leisure, and ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply.
At any point in time, a fraction nFt (n
I
t ) of the household members are formal
14When α2 approaches one, ct and gt are perfect substitutes. They are instead perfect comple-
ments if α2 tends to minus infinity. α2 = 0 nests the Cobb-Douglas specification.
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(informal) employees. Campolmi and Gnocchi (2014), Bru¨ckner and Pappa (2012)
and Bermperoglou et al. (2014) have added a labor force participation choice in
New Keynesian models of equilibrium unemployment. Following Ravn (2008), the
participation choice is modelled as a trade-off between the cost of giving up leisure
and the prospect of finding a job. In particular, the household chooses the fraction
of the unemployed actively searching for a job, ut, and the fraction which are out of
the labor force and enjoying leisure, lt, so that:
nFt + n
I
t + ut + lt = 1 (2.4)
The household chooses the fraction of jobseekers searching in each sector: a share st
of jobseekers look for a job in the informal sector, while the remainder, (1− st), seek
employment in the formal sector. That is, uIt ≡ stut and uFt ≡ (1− st)ut.
The household owns the capital stock, which evolves over time according to:
kt+1 = it + (1− δ)kt − ω
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt (2.5)
where it is investment, δ is a constant depreciation rate and
ω
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt are
adjustment costs.
The intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
(1+τ ct )ct+ it+
Bt+1pit+1
Rt
≤ rtkt+(1−τnt )wFt nFt +wItnIt +$uFt +Bt+Πpt −Tt (2.6)
where pit ≡ pt/pt−1 is the gross inflation rate, wjt , j = F, I, are the real wages in
the two sectors, rt is the real return on capital, $ denotes unemployment benefits,
available only to formal jobseekers (see e.g. Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007), Bt is the real
government bond holdings, Rt is the gross nominal interest rate, Π
p
t are the profits
of the monopolistic retailers, discussed below, and τ ct , τ
n
t and Tt represent taxes on
private consumption, labor income and lump-sum taxes respectively.
The household maximizes expected lifetime utility subject to (2.1) for each j,
(2.2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6). Taking as given njt , they choose ut, st (which
together determine lt) and n
j
t+1, as well as ct, kt+1 and Bt+1.
It is convenient to define the marginal value to the household of having an addi-
tional member employed in each sector, as follows:
V hnF t = λctw
F
t (1− τnt )− Φl−ϕt + (1− σF )λnF t (2.7)
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V hnI t = λctw
I
t − Φl−ϕt + (1− ρ− σI)λnI t (2.8)
where λnF t, λnI t and λct are the multipliers in front of (2.2), (2.3) and (2.6) respec-
tively.15
2.3.3 Production
2.3.3.1 Intermediate goods firms
Intermediate goods are produced with two different technologies:
xFt = (A
F
t n
F
t )
1−αF (kt)α
F
xIt = (A
I
tn
I
t )
1−αI
where Ajt denotes total factor productivity in sector j. Following the literature,
we assume that the informal production technology uses labor inputs only (see e.g.
Busato and Chiarini, 2004).
Firms maximize the discounted value of future profits, subject to (2.2) and (2.3).
That is, they take the number of workers currently employed in each sector, njt , as
given and choose the number of vacancies posted in each sector, υjt , so as to employ
the desired number of workers next period, njt+1. Here, firms adjust employment by
varying the number of workers (extensive margin) rather than the number of hours
per worker (intensive margin). According to Hansen (1985), most of the employment
fluctuations arise from movements in this margin. Firms also decide the amount
of private capital, kt, needed for production. They face a probability, ρ, of being
inspected by the fiscal authorities, convicted of tax evasion and forced to pay a
penalty, which is a fraction, γ, of their total revenues. We assume that, once they are
produced, there is no differentiation between intermediate goods from the different
sectors. In other words, we assume that formal and informal goods are perfect
substitutes, so that they are sold at the same price, pxt (see e.g. Orsi et al., 2014).
Hence the problem of an intermediate firm is summarized by the following Bellman
equation:
Q(nFt , n
I
t ) = max
kt,υFt ,υ
I
t
{
(1− ργ) pxt (xFt + xIt )− (1 + τ st )wFt nFt − wItnIt − rtkt
− κFυFt − κIυIt + Et
[
Λt,t+1Q(n
F
t+1, n
I
t+1)
] }
15The first order conditions of the household’s problem and the derivations of equations (2.7) and
(2.8) are presented in the online appendix.
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where τ st is a payroll tax, κ
j is the cost of posting a new vacancy in sector j, and
Λt,t+1 ≡ β Ucc,t+1Ucc,t = β
(
cct+1
cct
)−η
is a discount factor. The first-order conditions are:
rt = (1− ργ) pxt
(
αFxFt
kt
)
(2.9)
κF
ψfFt
= EtΛt,t+1
[
(1− ργ) pxt+1(1− αF )
xFt+1
nFt+1
− (1 + τ st+1)wFt+1 +
(1− σF )κF
ψfFt+1
]
(2.10)
κI
ψfIt
= EtΛt,t+1
[
(1− ργ) pxt+1(1− αI)
xIt+1
nIt+1
− wIt+1 +
(1− ρ− σI)κI
ψfIt+1
]
(2.11)
According to (2.9)-(2.11), the net value of the marginal product of private capital
should equal the real rental rate and the expected marginal cost of hiring a worker
in each sector j should equal the expected marginal benefit. The latter includes the
net value of the marginal product of labor minus the wage, augmented by the payroll
tax in the formal sector, plus the continuation value.
For convenience, we define the value of the marginal formal and informal job for
the intermediate firm:
V f
nF t
= (1− ργ) pxt (1− αF )
xFt
nFt
− (1 + τ st )wFt +
(1− σF )κF
ψfFt
(2.12)
V f
nI t
= (1− ργ) pxt (1− αI)
xIt
nIt
− wIt +
(1− ρ− σI)κI
ψfIt
(2.13)
2.3.3.2 Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by i on the
unit interval. Retailers buy intermediate goods and differentiate them with a tech-
nology that transforms one unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods,
and thus the relative price of intermediate goods, pxt , coincides with the real marginal
cost faced by the retailers. Let yit be the quantity of output sold by retailer i. The
final consumption good can be expressed as:
yt =
[ˆ 1
0
(yit)
−1
 di
] 
−1
where  > 1 is the constant elasticity of demand for retail goods. The final good is
sold at a price pt =
[´ 1
0
p1−it di
] 1
1−
. The demand for each intermediate good depends
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on its relative price and on aggregate demand:
yit =
(
pit
pt
)−
yt
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in any given period each retailer can reset
its price with a fixed probability (1− χ). Hence, the price index is given by:
pt =
[
(1− χ)(p∗t )1− + χ(pt−1)1−
] 1
1− (2.14)
Firms that are able to reset their price choose p∗it so as to maximize expected profits
given by:
Et
∞∑
s=0
χsΛt,t+s(p
∗
it − pxt+s)yit+s
The resulting expression for p∗it is:
p∗it =

− 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 χ
sΛt,t+sp
x
t+syit+s
Et
∑∞
s=0 χ
sΛt,t+syit+s
(2.15)
2.3.4 Government
Government expenditure consists of consumption purchases and unemployment ben-
efits, while revenues come from the collected fines and the payroll, consumption,
and labor income taxes, as well as the lump-sum taxes. The government deficit is
therefore defined by:
DFt = gt +$u
F
t − (1− ξTR)TRt − ργpxt (xFt + xIt )
where TRt ≡ (τnt +τ st )wFt nFt +τ ct ct+Tt denotes tax revenues and ξTR ∈ [0, 1) denotes
the embezzlement rate in the presence of corruption in the economy.
The government budget constraint is given by:
Bt +DFt = R
−1
t Bt+1pit+1
We assume that Tt, τ
s
t , and τ
c
t are constant and fixed at their steady state levels,
and we do not consider them as active instruments for fiscal consolidation. In our
model, the effects of payroll taxes are very similar to labor income taxes. Consump-
tion taxes can have different effects, but they generally constitute a relatively small
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source of tax revenues. Thus, in line with Erceg and Linde´ (2013), the government
has two potential fiscal instruments, g and τn. We consider each instrument sep-
arately, assuming that if one is active, the other remains fixed at its steady state
value. For Ψ ∈ {g, τn}, we assume fiscal rules of the form:
Ψt = Ψ
(1−βΨ0) ΨβΨ0t−1 exp{(1− βΨ0)[βΨ1(bt − b∗t ) + βΨ2(∆bt+1 −∆b∗t+1)]}
where bt =
Bt
yt
is the debt-to-GDP ratio, and b∗t is the target value for this ratio,
given by the AR(2) process:
log b∗t+1 − log b∗t = µb + ρ1(log b∗t − log b∗t−1)− ρ2 log b∗t − εbt
where εbt is a white noise shock representing a fiscal consolidation.
2.3.5 Closing the model
Monetary Policy There is an independent monetary authority that sets the nom-
inal interest rate as a function of current inflation according to the rule:
Rt = R exp{ζpi(pit − 1)}
where R is the steady state value of the nominal interest rate.
Goods Markets Total output must equal private and public demand. The aggre-
gate resource constraint is thus given by:
yt = ct + it + gt + κ
FυFt + κ
IυIt + ξ
TRTRt
where the last term is the resource cost of corruption in the economy.16
The aggregate price index, pt, is given by (2.14) and (2.15). The return on
private capital, rt, adjusts so that the capital demanded by the intermediate goods
firm, given by (2.9), is equal to the stock held by the household.
Bargaining over wages Wages in both sectors are determined by ex-post (after
matching) Nash bargaining. Workers and firms split rents and the part of the surplus
they receive depends on their bargaining power. We denote by ϑj ∈ (0, 1) the firms’
bargaining power in sector j. The Nash bargaining problem is to maximize the
16See the online appendix for full derivations.
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weighted sum of log surpluses:
max
wjt
{
(1− ϑj) log V hnjt + ϑj log V fnjt
}
where V hnjt and V
f
njt
are defined in equations (2.7), (2.8), (2.12) and (2.13). As shown
in the online appendix, wages are given by:
wFt =
(1− ϑF )
(1 + τ st )
(
(1− ργ) pxt (1− αF )
xFt
nFt
+
(1− σF )κF
ψfFt
)
+
ϑF
λct(1− τnt )
(
Φl−ϕt −(1−σF )λnF t
)
wIt = (1−ϑI)
(
(1− ργ) pxt (1− αI)
xIt
nIt
+
(1− ρ− σI)κI
ψfIt
)
+
ϑI
λct
(
Φl−ϕt −(1−ρ−σI)λnI t
)
2.3.6 Calibrating the Model
We calibrate the model using annual Italian data for the period 1982-2006.17 Table
2.4 displays the values used. We calibrate the labor force participation and unem-
ployment rate in the formal sector to match the observed average values. Thus, we
set official labor force participation, lf ≡ nF + uF , equal to 60% and the official
unemployment rate to 10%. We fix the separation rate σF = 0.07. We set the
probability of filling a vacancy in the formal sector ψfF = 0.96, and the matching
elasticity with respect to vacancies µ2 = 0.7, which is close to the estimate obtained
in Peracchi and Viviano (2004).
The capital depreciation rate, δ, is set equal to 0.088. Following the literature,
we set the discount factor β = 0.96. The elasticity of demand for retail goods, , is
set such that the gross steady state markup, 
−1 , is equal to 1.25, and the price of
the final good is normalized to one. The TFP parameter in the formal sector, AF ,
is normalized to one, and the capital share αF = 0.36. We set the vacancy costs in
the formal sector κF = 0.14, and the payroll tax rate τ s = 16%, close to the value
used in Orsi et al. (2014).
In the informal sector, we assume that TFP is lower than the formal sector
by setting AI = 0.6. According to Restrepo-Echavarria (2014), the fact that the
informal sector has restricted access to credit leads to fewer resources being devoted
to research and development, or to absorbing technology spillovers, which in turn
reduces productivity. Also, both Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) and Orsi et al. (2014)
emphasize empirical evidence suggesting that the workers in the informal sector have
17Details of the calibration exercise are in the online appendix.
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Table 2.4: Baseline Calibration Values
Parameter Description Value
β Discount Factor 0.96
δ Depreciation Rate 0.088
α1 Share of Private Consumption in Utility 1
η Inverse Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution 2
ϕ Inverse Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply 2
Φ Relative Utility from Leisure 0.7
lf Official Labor Force Participation 0.6
uF
lf Official Unemployment Rate 0.1
u
1−l Actual Unemployment Rate 0.09
s Share of Informal Jobseekers to Total 0.10
nI
n Share of Informal Employment to Total 0.13
σF Exogenous Job Destruction Rate - Formal Sector 0.07
σI Exogenous Job Destruction Rate - Informal Sector 0.0545
ρ Auditing Probability 0.02
µF1 Matching Efficiency - Formal Sector 0.85
µI1 Matching Efficiency - Informal Sector 0.12
µ2 Elasticity of Matching to Vacancies 0.7
ψfF Probability of Filling a Vacancy - Formal Sector 0.96
ψfI Probability of Filling a Vacancy - Informal Sector 0.05
ψhF Probability of Finding a Job - Formal Sector 0.63
ψhI Probability of Finding a Job - Informal Sector 0.91
AF TFP - Formal Sector 1
AI TFP - Informal Sector 0.6
αF Capital Share - Formal Sector 0.36
αI Production Function Parameter - Informal Sector 0.4
yI
y Share of Underground Output in Total 0.16
κF Vacancy Costs - Formal Sector 0.14
κF
wF
Vacancy Costs/Wage 0.21
κI Vacancy Costs - Informal Sector 0.13
 Price Elasticity of Demand 5
ϑF Firm’s Bargaining Power - Formal Sector 0.22
ϑI Firm’s Bargaining Power - Informal Sector 0.80
wI
wF
Formal/Informal Wage Differentials 0.98
g
y Government Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio 0.11
$
wF
Replacement Rate 0.35
τn Labor Income Tax Rate 0.4
τ s Payroll Tax Rate 0.16
τ c Consumption Tax Rate 0.18
γ Proportional Fine in Case of Auditing 0.3
ξTR Embezzlement Rate 0.2
DF
y Deficit-to-GDP Ratio -0.04
b Debt-to-GDP Ratio 1.03
ρ1, ρ2 Debt-to-GDP Target Parameters 0.85, 0.0001
χ Price Stickiness 0.25
ω Capital Adjustment Costs 0.5
ζpi Taylor Rule Parameter 1.5
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lower education levels.18
Using the ISTAT data, we set the share of informal employment to total employ-
ment equal to 0.13, and we set αI = 0.4, implying the share of shadow output to total
output y
I
y
= 16%. We set the exogenous job destruction rate in the informal sector
σI = 0.0545, the probability of filling a vacancy in the informal sector ψfI = 0.05,
and the vacancy cost in the informal sector κI = 0.13. These values yield a relatively
small wage premium for the formal sector, w
I
wF
= 0.98, in line with the literature. The
probability of audit and the fraction of total revenues paid as a fine in the event of
an audit are set as follows: ρ = 0.02, close to the value used in Boeri and Garibaldi
(2007), and γ = 0.3. For the probability of tax audit, we also consider alternative
values (ρ = 0.04 and ρ = 0.01) in the sensitivity analysis.
We set the replacement rate $
wF
= 0.35, close to the estimates in Martin (1996),
and used by Fugazza and Jacques (2004). Government spending as a share of GDP
and the remaining tax rates are set as follows: g
y
= 11%, τn = 40%, in line with
Orsi et al. (2014), and τ c = 18%. The steady state debt-to-GDP ratio b = 103%.
Regarding the embezzlement parameter, we set ξTR = 0.2 and study the sensitivity
of our results to different values of this parameter.
We begin by assuming purely wasteful government expenditure, setting α1 = 1,
and will consider utility enhancing government spending as an extension. Regarding
the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution, η, much of the literature cites
the econometric estimates of Hansen and Singleton (1983), which place it “between
0 and 2”, and often choose a value greater than unity. In our calibration, we set
η = 2 and we perform sensitivity analysis by considering η equal to 0.5 and 1. The
inverse of the Frisch elasticity, ϕ, is set equal to 2 and we examine the sensitivity
of our results to changes in this parameter. Finally, we set the inflation targeting
parameter in the Taylor rule ζpi = 1.5, the capital adjustment costs ω = 0.5 and the
price-stickiness parameter χ = 0.25.
2.4 Results
We present responses following a negative debt-target shock (following Erceg and
Linde´, 2013). We compare the effects of a 5% reduction in the desired long run
debt target, which is achieved after 10 years, either through a fall in government
18Orsi et al. (2014) also note the equivalence of assuming lower productivity in the informal sector
to assuming a cost for concealing production.
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consumption expenditure, or a hike in labor tax rates.19
2.4.1 Dynamics in a Model without Tax Evasion and Cor-
ruption
As a benchmark, we begin by analyzing the responses of a standard model where
tax evasion and corruption are absent, shown in Figure 2.5.
A consolidation carried out through a fall in government spending has two effects.
Firstly, there is a negative demand effect for firms, which leads, in the presence of
nominal rigidities, to a fall in labor demand and hence in vacancies. Second, there is
a positive wealth effect for the household, which increases consumption and invest-
ment and reduces labor force participation. Given the drop in both labor demand
and supply, employment falls and the wage rate rises. Output falls in the short run,
but increases in the medium and long run because investment, and hence the cap-
ital stock, increases. The unemployment rate reflects movements in the number of
jobseekers: it falls on impact, but then increases as employment and wages adjust.
When the fiscal consolidation is carried out through a labor tax hike, there is
a negative wealth effect for the household which makes consumption fall, and in-
vestment fall with a lag. However, as the return from employment falls, there is a
substitution effect which outweighs the wealth effect, and leads to a decrease in labor
force participation. The fall in private demand induces firms to contract their labor
demand, again expressed through a drop in vacancies. Employment and output fall,
and the responses are significantly larger and more persistent than in the case of
spending cuts, due to the fall in investment.
Thus, our benchmark model seems to be consistent with the evidence of Alesina
et al. (2013): spending cuts are accompanied by mild and short-lived recessions,
while tax hikes lead to more prolonged and deep recessions.
2.4.2 Dynamics in a Model with Corruption
Next, we study how the responses change when we introduce embezzlement of public
funds in our model, shown in Figure 2.6. In our baseline calibration we set the
embezzlement rate ξTR = 0.2.
The introduction of corruption does not alter the responses of the economy quali-
tatively. In the case of government spending cuts, the effects are negligible. However,
19For comparison purposes, throughout this section we adjust the parameters of the policy rules
for each case to ensure that the debt target is met after 10 years.
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in the case of labor tax rate hikes, there are notable quantitative differences. Given
that a fraction of tax revenues are now lost through embezzlement, the change in
the tax rates required to achieve debt consolidation is larger. This leads to an am-
plification of the effects observed in all variables.
We also check the sensitivity of this effect to the embezzlement rate. Informal
accounts suggest that there are often large rents to be obtained in less developed
economies, although precise estimates are difficult to obtain. Krueger (1974) esti-
mates rents generated by import licenses alone to be in the range of 15% of GNP
for Turkey in 1968; similarly large estimates are obtained by Gallagher (1991) for
a sample of African countries from 1975 to 1987, ranging between 6% and 37% of
GDP. Setting ξTR = 0.2 implies a value of embezzled tax revenues equal to 4.2%
of GDP. Given the estimates for developing countries, we believe that a reasonable
range of estimates of rent seeking as a percentage of GDP in Italy should be between
0.1% and 5%. This implies values for ξTR that vary between 0.05 and 0.25. Results
for this sensitivity analysis, presented in the online appendix, show that with the
higher the degree of corruption in the economy, the larger the tax hikes needed for
consolidation and therefore the larger the amplification of the observed responses.
2.4.3 Dynamics in a Model with Tax Evasion
We now move to a model with tax evasion. Here, we incorporate the informal sector
and set the corruption parameter again to zero. Figure 2.7 presents the responses of
the formal sector and of fiscal variables, and Figure 2.8 shows the responses in the
informal sector.
To start with, notice that the response of the formal sector is qualitatively similar
to the benchmark model. However, there is an additional channel at play. For
the case of tax hikes, unemployed jobseekers reallocate their labor supply and the
intermediate firms reallocate their labor demand towards the informal sector. Tax
hikes provide direct incentives for jobseekers to search in the informal sector because
of the higher tax rates in the formal sector. At the same time, intermediate firms find
it profitable to post vacancies in the informal sector because of the fall in the informal
wage. The fall in investment, and hence the capital stock, lowers the productivity
differential between the two sectors, and further provides incentives for agents to
reallocate to the informal sector. As a result, shadow employment as a share of total
employment increases.
For the case of expenditure cuts, the negative demand effect of the spending cut
affects both formal and informal production, leading to a reduction in labor demand
71
F
igu
re
2.7:
IR
F
s
of
M
o
d
el
w
ith
T
ax
E
vasion
2
4
6
8
10
−1.5 −1
−0.5 0
PA
R
TICIPATIO
N RATE
2
4
6
8
10
−0.4
−0.2 0
0.2
CO
NSUM
PTIO
N
2
4
6
8
10
−2 −1 0 1 2
IN
VESTM
ENT
2
4
6
8
10
−0.05 0
0.05
G
RO
SS REAL INTEREST RATE
2
4
6
8
10
−1
−0.5 0
0.5
CAPITAL
2
4
6
8
10
−8 −6 −4 −2 0 2
FO
RM
AL VACANCIES
2
4
6
8
10
−5 0 5 FO
RM
AL JO
BSEEKERS
2
4
6
8
10
−2
−1.5 −1
−0.5 0 FO
RM
AL EM
PLO
YM
ENT
2
4
6
8
10
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
FO
RM
AL W
AG
E
2
4
6
8
10
−1.5 −1
−0.5 0
FO
RM
AL O
UTPUT
2
4
6
8
10
−4 −2 0 2 4 6
ACTIVE INSTRUM
ENT
 
 
2
4
6
8
10
1 2 3 4
TA
X R
EVENUE
2
4
6
8
10
−15
−10 −5 D
EFICIT−TO
−G
DP RATIO
2
4
6
8
10
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 D
EB
T−TO
−G
DP RATIO
2
4
6
8
10
−4 −2 0 2 4 6
O
FFICIAL UNEM
PLO
YM
ENT RATE
SPENDING
 CUT
LA
BO
R TAX HIKE
72
F
ig
u
re
2.
8:
IR
F
s
of
M
o
d
el
w
it
h
T
ax
E
va
si
on
-
In
fo
rm
al
S
ec
to
r
2
4
6
8
10
−
505101520
UN
DE
RG
RO
UN
D 
VA
CA
NC
IE
S
 
 
2
4
6
8
10
−
50510152025
UN
DE
RG
RO
UN
D 
JO
BS
EE
KE
RS
2
4
6
8
10
−
2.
5
−
2
−
1.
5
−
1
−
0.
50
UN
DE
RG
RO
UN
D 
W
AG
E
2
4
6
8
10
0123456
UN
DE
RG
RO
UN
D 
EM
PL
O
YM
EN
T
2
4
6
8
10
0
0.
51
1.
52
2.
53
3.
5
UN
DE
RG
RO
UN
D 
O
UT
PU
T
SP
EN
DI
NG
 C
UT
LA
B
O
R 
TA
X 
HI
KE
73
in both sectors. Similarly, as labor force participation falls, there is a reduction in
unemployed jobseekers in both sectors. This causes a contraction in total employ-
ment. Moreover, there is a reallocation of labor towards the formal sector; shadow
employment as a share of total employment falls, consistent with the evidence we
presented in Section 2.2. This happens for two reasons. Firstly, the formal labor
market has a higher matching efficiency, and a lower job destruction rate. Secondly,
in addition to having a higher TFP level, the rise in the capital stock further increases
the productivity of the formal sector relative to the informal sector. In order to take
advantage of these efficiency gains, and thus mitigate the negative effects of the fiscal
contraction, agents optimally choose to reallocate towards the formal sector.
2.4.4 A Model with Tax Evasion and Corruption
In this section we introduce both tax evasion and corruption and, in Figure 2.9,
we compare the responses of output, the unemployment rate and welfare to the
benchmark model.20
For spending cuts, shown in the top panel, the presence of tax evasion and cor-
ruption generates smaller losses in output, a drop in the unemployment rate at all
horizons, and larger welfare gains. With tax evasion and corruption, the tax adjust-
ments required to achieve a given change in deficit are larger, and thus, following
a spending cut, taxes in the future are expected to fall by more. In other words,
there is an amplification of the positive wealth effect. Hence the rise in consump-
tion and the fall in labor force participation are larger relative to the model without
tax evasion and corruption, making welfare gains larger. The increased crowding-in
of private consumption mitigates the negative demand effect for the firms, thereby
mitigating output losses. The larger reduction in labor force participation implies a
fall in the number of formal jobseekers, and hence in the official unemployment rate,
at all horizons.
For tax hikes, shown in the middle panel, the presence of corruption and tax
evasion amplifies the output losses, particularly in the long run. This is due to the loss
of tax revenue from both corruption and tax evasion, implying that larger increases in
tax rates are needed to reduce debt-to-GDP. This increases the distortionary effects
of the consolidation, leading to a larger drop in labor force participation, private
consumption and investment. In addition, the reallocation towards the informal
sector increases the inefficiencies due to the lower productivity in this sector. Thus,
20Welfare is computed as per-period steady state consumption equivalents. IRFs of all other
variables are included in the online appendix.
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Figure 2.9: Comparison of Benchmark and Full Model
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there is a larger contraction in the formal sector, which is also evident in the response
of the official unemployment rate: the initial fall is amplified as jobseekers drop out of
the formal sector, and the rise in the long run is higher as firms post fewer vacancies
in this sector. Furthermore, tax hikes lead to welfare losses. Initially, these losses
are lower with tax evasion and corruption, but in the medium and long run, as
consumption falls increasingly, we obtain higher losses.
The bottom panel depicts the responses in the case of a mixed consolidation.
Here, we allow both policy instruments, g and τn, to move simultaneously to reduce
the deficit, which follows the debt-targeting rule. We fix the policy mix such that a
fraction a of the reductions in deficit come from expenditure cuts and (1 − a) from
revenue enhancements, and set a = 0.5. In this case, the responses of consumption
and investment are determined by the competing positive and negative wealth effects
from the two instruments, and the presence of tax evasion and corruption plays an
important role in determining this relative strength. In the benchmark model, the
positive wealth effect of the expenditure cut is dominant and consumption rises for
several periods. When there is tax evasion and corruption, this is no longer true and
consumption and investment fall in all periods. Hence, as in the case of tax hikes,
output and unemployment responses are amplified in the presence of tax evasion and
corruption. This is in line with the evidence presented in Section 2.2. Moreover, the
welfare gains obtained from mixed consolidation packages in the benchmark model
turn into welfare losses in the model with tax evasion and corruption.
2.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
Both the effects of labor tax hikes and expenditure cuts depend crucially on some
modeling assumptions. In this section we present how the implications of fiscal
consolidations change when we modify key assumptions or parameters of the model.
2.4.5.1 Spending Cuts
Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution As we saw, the effects of the spend-
ing cuts depend crucially on the size of the wealth effect, which in turn depends
on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. As shown in the first panel of Fig-
ure 2.10, repeating the simulations using lower values for the inverse elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, η = 0.5 and η = 0.95, yields qualitatively similar results.
Quantitatively, for lower values of η, the risk aversion of agents is lower and after
a spending cut we observe larger increases in consumption and smaller increases in
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Figure 2.10: Sensitivity Analysis for Spending Cuts in the Full Model
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investment, which dampens the long run expansion in output, as well as a larger drop
in the labor force participation rate, which dampens the drop in the unemployment
rate.
Utility-enhancing Government Spending Assuming that government expen-
ditures provide a public good, which is consumed by households, can change the
welfare implications of spending cuts. To illustrate this point, we set α1 = 0.85 and
α2 = −0.25, so that private and public spending are weak complements. The top
panel of Figure 2.10 compares the results of this case with those obtained with waste-
ful government spending. In the case of utility-enhancing expenditures, a spending
cut directly reduces the consumption bundle, and households are forced to offset
this fall by further increasing private consumption. Thus, we see a larger crowding-
in of private consumption, which mitigates the output and unemployment effects of
spending cuts. However, the welfare effects are reversed: the drop in the consumption
bundle causes welfare to fall for several periods.
Liquidity Constrained Agents The presence of liquidity constrained consumers
has been shown to play an important role in determining the response of private
consumption to a government spending cut (see e.g. Gal´ı et al., 2007). To explore
how the presence of liquidity constrained consumers can affect our model, we assume
a fraction of rule of thumb (ROT) household members, which we set equal to 44%, in
line with the Italian household survey reported by Martin and Philippon (2014). As
shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2.10, output and unemployment responses are
amplified and welfare gains are mitigated following a spending cut. The presence of
ROT agents reduces the positive wealth effect that the fiscal contraction generates,
which implies a smaller increase in consumption and, hence, welfare, and a larger
contraction in output.
2.4.5.2 Tax Hikes
The Elasticity of Taxable Income A large body of the literature, initiated by
Feldstein (1999), has argued that the costs of labor taxes can be summarized by the
elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax share. The magnitude of
this elasticity can therefore yield further insights about the effects of tax hikes in the
presence of tax evasion and corruption. We compute the taxable income elasticity
by dividing the cumulative response of taxable income by the cumulative response
of the net tax share, up to the point that tax rates return to steady state. For the
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benchmark model, the elasticity of taxable income equals 0.23, while incorporating
tax evasion and corruption in the analysis almost doubles this elasticity to 0.42.21
This is not surprising, given that we are allowing workers to move out of taxable
work, in the formal sector, not only by leaving the workforce but also by working
in the informal sector. Data also suggests higher estimates of the taxable income
elasticity in countries with more tax evasion and corruption. For example, Kleven
and Schultz (2014) provide an estimate for Denmark equal to 0.09 for this elasticity
and, using the same methodology, Arrazola et al. (2014) report a taxable income
elasticity equal to 1.5 in Spain.
Of course many of our parameter choices affect the estimated value of the taxable
income elasticity and so, in turn, our conclusions about the effects of tax hikes in
a model with tax evasion and corruption. To investigate this, we first consider the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, η. Smaller values of η imply
higher values of the long run elasticity of taxable income: for η = 0.95 and 0.5, the
corresponding elasticities are 0.43 and 0.44, respectively. Accordingly, the higher
values of the taxable income elasticity, implied by the lower η, are associated with
higher output and welfare losses, as well as higher unemployment in the medium and
long run, as seen in the top panel of Figure 2.11.
Next, we use alternative values for the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, ϕ. The value of the labor supply elastictity determines the size of the sub-
stitution effect following a tax hike and this, in turn, affects the taxable income
elasticity in our model. Higher values of the labor supply elasticity, meaning lower
values of ϕ, are associated with higher values of the taxable income elasticity, equal
to 0.56, 0.36 and 0.34 for ϕ = 0.5, 5 and 8, respectively. Results presented in the
second panel of Figure 2.11 indicate that output losses and medium and long run
unemployment increase with the Frisch elasticity.22
Finally, we consider the effects of a reduction in the ability of workers to reallocate
between the two sectors, in particular by assuming a lower value for the matching
efficiency parameter in the informal sector, µI1 = 0.05 instead of 0.12. This modifica-
tion reduces the taxable income elasticity to 0.29, close to the value in the benchmark
model, and we see from the third panel of Figure 2.11 that the model dynamics also
resemble the dynamics of the benchmark model. This is because reallocation to the
informal sector is now more difficult, implying that the reallocation channel plays a
21Our estimates are broadly in line with those presented in recent studies that place the value of
this elasticity in the (0.2, 0.8) range. For a survey of the literature, see Saez et al. (2012).
22Welfare comparisons are more difficult when we change η and ϕ because these parameters have
a direct impact on the relative weight of consumption and leisure in the utility function.
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smaller role in the dynamics.
The Detection Probability In our model, the incentives to tax evade are also
affected by the probability of detection. We investigate the role of the detection
probability in the last panel of Figure 2.11. A higher detection probability reduces
the output, unemployment, and welfare losses after a consolidation through tax hikes,
since the incentives to reallocate to the informal sector are reduced. However, this
effect is mostly seen in the short and medium run; in the long run, the results are
similar for the different values of ρ.23
2.5 Policy Evaluation
Since the model qualitatively replicates the empirical evidence presented in Section
2.2, we employ it to evaluate the effects of consolidation packages implemented in
southern European countries in recent years. We recalibrate the model for Greece,
Portugal and Spain, three countries which are also characterized by high corruption
and tax evasion, and analyze the effects of their recent consolidation packages.
2.5.1 Calibration
Using the information in OECD (2012), we adjust the size of the consolidation in
each country to match the reduction in the deficit-to-GDP ratio implemented in 2010
and also replicate the announced consolidation volumes in the long run. Table 2.5
reports the consolidation in 2010 for each country and the intended consolidation to
be implemented by 2015. We see that Greece implemented the most severe austerity
package. The consolidation package of Italy in 2010 was small, but larger consoli-
dation volumes were announced for 2015. The consolidation packages in Spain and
Portugal were similar in 2010, but Portugal announced a slightly larger long run
consolidation volume. In order to replicate the actual consolidation packages, we
allow both instruments to move simultaneously, again using OECD (2012) to fix
the relative contribution of the two instruments for each country. Portugal used
more tax hikes than expenditure cuts, while the other countries used predominantly
expenditure-based measures.24
23Since the auditing probability affects the reallocation of workers between sectors, it could also
affect the consolidation through spending cuts. However, the results under the alternative values
of ρ do not change substantially compared to the results of the baseline calibration.
24See the tables on p.138, 166, 206, 226 of OECD (2012).
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Figure 2.11: Sensitivity Analysis for Labor Tax Hikes in the Full Model
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Table 2.5: Policy Evaluation: Calibration Values
Greece Italy Spain Portugal
Consolidation Volume - 2010 (% GDP) 7.8 0.9 2.7 2.3
Consolidation Volume - 2015 (% GDP) 18.5 6.1 7.3 12.2
Expenditure Share in Policy Mix (%) 60 58 66 23
Informal Employment (% Total Employment) 14 13 12.5 12.5
Embezzlement Rate (%) 20 20 10 10
Unemployment Rate (%) 10 10 15 7
Labor Force Participation Rate (%) 64 60 65 70
Formal Firm’s Bargaining Power (%) 22 20 27 32
Unemployment Benefit Replacement Rate (%) 35 35 45 45
Debt-to-GDP ratio (%) 145 120.1 61.2 93.3
Government Consumption Spending (% GDP) 5 11 6 5
Table 2.5 also summarizes the differences in the calibration for the various economies.
We use the estimates of shadow output in Elgin and O¨ztunah (2012) to determine
the relative share of shadow employment across countries, which gives comparable
numbers, though slightly higher in Greece. Following the World Bank’s Control of
Corruption index, shown in Figure 2.1, we set the embezzlement rate in Greece and
Italy higher than Spain and Portugal. According to the OECD statistics, Portugal
has a notably healthier labor market, with the highest labor force participation rate
and the lowest unemployment rate. According to the CEP-OECD database and
the ICTWSS (Data Base on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage
Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960-2011) indices, Italy and Greece
have higher unionisation and coordination of bargaining, reflected in our model by
lower bargaining power for firms, compared to Spain and Portugal. Also, according
to the CEP-OECD database and the estimates in Martin (1996), replacement rates
are lower in Italy and Greece relative to Spain and Portugal. Accordingly in Table
2.5 we assume replacement rates of 35% for Italy and Greece and 45% for Portugal
and Spain. Spain has the lowest debt-to-GDP ratio, while Greece and Italy both
face debt well over 100% of GDP. Finally, the size of the government consumption
expenditure as a percentage of GDP is higher in Italy than in the other countries.
2.5.2 Results
The simulation results are shown in Figure 2.12. Despite the substantial use of
expenditure cuts, we see that tax evasion increases in all countries. With the use of
tax hikes in the consolidation mix, the direct incentive to produce in the informal
sector dominates the efficiency gains from producing in the formal sector, leading to
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a reallocation towards the informal sector. The relative size of the increase across
countries is determined by the relative size of the tax hikes. Note that Portugal
experiences the largest long run increase in the informal economy because of the
heavy use of tax hikes in their consolidation.
The model predicts sizeable and persistent output losses following all consolida-
tion packages. The relative size of these losses across countries reflects the size of the
consolidation: Greece exhibits large losses, while in Italy the relatively small adjust-
ment implies smaller effect. As a result, the unemployment rate increases in the long
run in Greece, while the effects are negligible in Italy. However, note that Portugal
experiences the largest output drop in the long run, because of the large share of tax
hikes in the consolidation mix. Accordingly, Spain experiences much smaller output
losses, despite the similar size of the consolidation package. Nonetheless, given the
higher efficiency of labor markets in Portugal, these two countries experience similar
unemployment outcomes. Finally, the fiscal consolidations induce welfare losses in
all countries. Both the size of the consolidation and the composition of the package
determines the magnitude of the losses. In particular, Italy experiences the low-
est welfare losses, given the small consolidation, whilst Portugal experiences higher
welfare losses than Greece due to the large use of tax hikes.
2.5.3 Counterfactual Analysis
The austerity packages implemented in recent years have sparked a debate about the
need to fight tax evasion and corruption. It is therefore interesting to ask whether
reforms aimed at reducing tax evasion and corruption may change the effects of the
current consolidation plans. To investigate the issue, we carry out two counterfactual
experiments: we simulate the fiscal consolidation plans first assuming that the tax
auditing probability is doubled, and then assuming that the embezzlement rate is
reduced by half. Figure 2.13 reports the welfare responses in the baseline calibra-
tion, in the case when the auditing probability is higher, and in the case when the
embezzlement rate is lower, for each country.
We find that welfare losses would be mitigated by the reforms. Reducing tax
evasion and corruption implies that the deficit reductions are achieved with lower
hikes in the tax rate. With the reduction in tax evasion, there is a sizeable reduction
in welfare losses in Italy and Portugal, and short run welfare gains for Greece and
Spain, which have relatively more expenditure-based consolidation policies. When
corruption is reduced, welfare improves substantially in Italy, and in Greece on im-
pact, since these two countries have a higher degree of corruption. In Spain and
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Figure 2.13: Welfare Effects of Fiscal Consolidation Plans: Counterfactual Analysis
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Portugal, where the level of corruption is lower, the gains from reducing corruption
are small relative to fighting tax evasion.
2.6 Conclusions
Empirical evidence indicates that accounting for tax evasion and corruption is key for
understanding the effects of fiscal consolidation. A New Keynesian DSGE model with
involuntary unemployment, an informal sector and public corruption, demonstrates
that these two features amplify the contractionary effects of labor tax hikes, while
they mitigate the effects of expenditure cuts. It also shows that the instrument
used to achieve fiscal consolidation affects the incentives of agents to produce in the
informal sector. Consistent with VAR evidence obtained for Italian, spending cuts
reduce the size of the informal economy, while tax hikes increase it.
Given the model’s ability to reproduce the qualitative features of the data, we
analyze how current fiscal consolidation plans in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
affect tax evasion, output, unemployment and welfare. The model predicts increasing
levels of tax evasion during the consolidation in all countries, and prolonged output
and welfare losses. Greece suffers heavy losses due to the severity of the austerity
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package implemented; Portugal experiences the largest drops in output and welfare
because of the heavy use of tax hikes in their consolidation package. Furthermore,
the welfare costs of these consolidations would have been smaller if tax evasion and
corruption had been reduced. Hence, reforms aimed at fighting public corruption
and tax evasion should go hand-in-hand with austerity measures in order to mitigate
the welfare costs of fiscal consolidations.
Our exercise is the first attempt to analyze the effects of fiscal consolidation in
the presence of tax evasion and corruption. Since the model is stylized, it leaves
out important aspects of reality that could affect our conclusions. For example, in
our economy there is a representative household, and so we cannot assess the effects
of tax evasion and corruption on income inequality. Also, we consider only cuts
in government consumption expenditures and not in other items of the government
budget. Furthermore, our model does not allow for evasion of consumption taxes,
which is an important component of tax evasion in southern European countries.
Finally, the model treats the degree of public corruption as a parameter, which does
not allow it to respond to cyclical factors or to interact with tax evasion. We leave
these extensions for future research.
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Chapter 3
Fiscal Consolidation in a
Disinflationary Environment:
Price- vs. Quantity-Based
Measures
This is joint work with Evi Pappa and Eugenia Vella.
Abstract
An important feature of the current economic conditions in the EU, which
challenges the design and implementation of macroeconomic policy, is inflation
uncertainty. With monetary policy at the zero lower bound, and inflation well
below its target, a key issue for policy makers is the effect this has on the
transmission of fiscal policy. We aim to address this question, in particular
comparing the effects of price-based and quantity-based fiscal instruments. In
this paper we focus on the public wage bill, and consider a model of a monetary
union in which the government can consolidate their debt through reductions
in the public wage or public employment. We find that in both cases the low-
inflation environment eliminates the expansionary effects of the reduction in
the public wage bill for the private sector. The drag in economic activity is
substantially amplified in the low inflation environment, with increased debt-
to-GDP levels during the consolidation process.
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3.1 Introduction
An important feature of the current economic conditions in the EU, which challenges
the design and implementation of macroeconomic policy, is inflation uncertainty.
With monetary policy constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB henceforth), in-
flation in the euro area has remained below the ECB’s medium-run objective for
some time. While some recent studies have looked at the impact of the ZLB on
fiscal policy, research on the differential impact of inflation on different budgetary
items is limited. In this context, the aim of this paper is to examine the effects
of alternative fiscal consolidation strategies to reduce the public wage bill, specifi-
cally comparing price-based measures and quantity-based measures, under different
inflation environments.
As seen in Figure 3.1, since 2012, the inflation rate across the euro area has been
trending downwards and still remains below the ECB’s 2% target. At the same time,
the scope for monetary policy easing has been limited, with nominal interest rates
at the ZLB, and the effects of unconventional measures, such as the recent asset
purchases, remaining uncertain.
This environment has important implications for fiscal policy. Firstly, low in-
flation is generally considered to make fiscal consolidation more difficult. Indeed,
historically, periods of high inflation have been used to reduce debt-to-GDP ratios,
for example in many western countries following both the First and Second World
War (see Reinhart et al. 2015). From a theoretical point of view, low inflation re-
duces the growth in nominal GDP and, all else equal, raises deficit- and debt-to-GDP
ratios. Debt dynamics would be left unchanged if nominal interest rates fall by the
same magnitude as inflation, thus leaving real rates unchanged. Instead, when nom-
inal rates have hit the ZLB, falling inflation leads to rising real interest rates, making
it more difficult to reduce government debt-to-GDP ratios.
Moreover, much of the literature, both theoretical and empirical, has found that
fiscal multipliers are higher when monetary policy is constrained. In particular,
Eggertsson (2011) found that the government spending multiplier goes from below
0.5, to around 2.3 at the ZLB, and that tax multipliers even change sign and become
negative at the ZLB. Similar results are found in the studies of Christiano et al.
(2011), Coenen et al. (2012) and De Long and Summers (2012). Empirically, Ilzetzki
et al. (2013) corroborate these results, finding that government spending multipliers
are substantially higher in countries operating under fixed exchange rates, which
is another form of constrained monetary policy. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014)
draw similar conclusions regarding the multiplier of military spending, although their
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Figure 3.1: Inflation and Interest Rates in the Euro Area Source: Eurostat
analysis is not a direct comparison of different monetary regimes. Based on these
principles, several papers discuss the potential role of fiscal stimulus in alleviating a
ZLB crisis: Correia et al. (2013) suggest an alternative stimulus strategy to the use of
government spending, based on consumption taxation, and Rendahl (2015) focuses on
amplification effects in the labour market due to the ZLB and how expansionary fiscal
policy can best exploit these. The converse of these arguments is that attempting
to carry out fiscal consolidation in a liquidity trap can be very costly, and even
self-defeating.
Another important way in which low inflation affects fiscal policy is the fact that
inflation shocks can be expected to have a different impact, both in terms of size
and timing, across different government revenue and expenditure categories. In line
with the research highlighted above, Jalil (2012) finds that the differences between
the estimated multipliers of government spending and taxation can be explained
by the differential response of monetary policy. Erceg and Linde (2013) find that
the magnitude of the output contraction induced by spending-based consolidation
is roughly three times larger when monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB than
when it is unconstrained. They also find that, at the ZLB, a tax-based consolidation
is less costly in the short-run than a spending-based consolidation, while the opposite
93
is true when monetary policy is unconstrained. McManus et al. (2014) find that the
ZLB has different effects on different fiscal consolidation instruments, and should
therefore be considered when designing austerity packages.
One dimension of this comparison which has been overlooked is that the effec-
tiveness of consolidation packages that focus on quantity-based measures instead
of price-based measures may be different depending on the inflation environment.
In that context, reducing the wage bill via cutting wages (price-based measure)
or reducing public employees (quantity-based measure) may have a different bud-
getary impact depending on the inflation environment. This paper aims to uncover
the potential effect of a low-inflation environment on these alternative consolidation
strategies, with a particular focus on the public wage bill.
Recent austerity packages implemented in many European countries, like Greece
and Spain, have placed special emphasis on the reduction of the public wage bill.
According to data reported by Holm-Hadulla et al. (2010), shown in Figure 3.2, the
government wage bill before the crisis accounted, on average, for almost a quarter
of total public spending and more than 10% of GDP in the euro area. On average,
almost 15% of the labour force in the euro area was employed by the public sector.
Since the beginning of the crisis in 2008, most of these countries have been trying to
cut government wage bills, by freezing wages and hirings, and cutting or retrenching
specific indemnities or benefits. A recent report by Gama et al. (2015) shows that
even countries that showed more resilience in the aftermath of the crisis, such as
the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, saw steep declines in
public administration employment (see Figure 3.3). Cuts in public sector wages have
been widely implemented in countries like Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal (see Figure 3.4).
In this paper, we develop a DSGE model through which we can study the differen-
tial effects of quantity-based and price-based consolidation measures. In particular,
we consider a New-Keynesian model of a two-block monetary union, with nominal
rigidities in the form of monopolistic retailers facing price-stickiness. In order to build
a complete model of the labour market, we incorporate both search and matching
frictions, leading to involuntary unemployment, and an endogenous labour force par-
ticipation decision, leading to voluntary unemployment. Finally, to study the effects
of the public wage bill, we allow the government to hire public employees to produce
a public good that is used by private firms.
Following Erceg and Linde (2013) and Pappa et al. (2015), fiscal policy responds
to the deviation of the debt-to-GDP ratio from a target value, and fiscal consolidation
occurs when this target is hit by a negative shock. We focus attention on two fiscal
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Figure 3.2: Public Wage Bill and Public Employment Before the Crisis Source:
Holm-Hadulla et al. (2010)
Figure 3.3: Changes in Public Sector Employment Following the Crisis Source: Gama
et al. (2015)
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Figure 3.4: Changes in Public Sector Wages Following the Crisis Source: Eurostat
consolidation instruments on the part of the government: public wage cuts and public
vacancy cuts. We consider each instrument separately, assuming that if one is active,
the other remains fixed at its steady state value. We then repeat this experiment
when the economy faces low inflation due to a liquidity trap. This setup allows us to
compare, for a given consolidation volume, the effects of the alternative consolidation
strategies in different environments.
There has been little work so far in explicitly modeling the interaction between
the private and the public sector. The existing literature has largely focused on eval-
uating the impact of the public sector on the level or volatility of employment and
wages (see e.g. Algan et al. (2002), Quadrini and Trigari 2007, Ho¨rner et al. 2007,
and Gomes 2015b). Ardagna (2007) has shown using a DSGE model with a union-
ized labour market (but without unemployment) that, in response to a debt-financed
increase in public-sector employment and wages, unions demand higher wages, which
leads to a fall in private-sector employment and capital stock, and a contraction in
the economy. Michaillat (2014) makes an important contribution by finding that the
“government multiplier”, defined as the additional number of workers hired in the
private sector when one public job is created, is positive and countercyclical, sug-
gesting that the public sector tends to stabilize labour market fluctuations. Bradley
et al. (2015) are the first to estimate (using British data) a model with equilibrium
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unemployment and a public sector. The authors also run simulations that attempt
to mimic austerity measures implemented across Europe after the 2008 recession,
namely a reduction in public sector hiring, an increase in public sector layoffs, and
progressive and proportional cuts to the distribution of wages in the public sector.
They find that all four policies increase hiring and turnover in the private sector, re-
duce public sector employment which is largely compensated by an increase in private
sector employment, summing up to very moderate changes in aggregate unemploy-
ment; and finally, exert a very small impact on mean wages and in the aggregate
economy. In an earlier contribution, Demekas and Kontolemis (2000) developed a
simple two-sector model of the labour market with endogenous unemployment, but
without explicit dynamics, showing that increases in government wages lead through
worker flow dynamics to increases in private sector wages and, therefore, directly
to higher unemployment. Increases in government employment do not have a sig-
nificant impact on unemployment, and might even raise it. Using data for Greece,
they found strong support for their theoretical predictions. On the empirical front,
Cavallo (2005) found for the US that hours, output, and investment in the private
sector decrease in response to an unanticipated increase in the government wage bill
expenditure, in line with Finn (1998), but without distinguishing between public
wage and employment policies.
In our model, in normal times, a fiscal consolidation through a cut in public wages
is able to reduce the public debt-to-GDP ratio faster than public vacancy costs,
although both have similar positive effects on private output through an increase
in private-sector hirings. In the case of public wage cuts the increase in private-
sector employment dominates the fall in public employment, leading to a fall in
the unemployment rate, while in the case of public vacancy cuts the unemployment
rate rises. Hence, public wage cuts are a preferable consolidation strategy to public
vacancy cuts in normal times.
In a low inflation environment, induced by a negative demand shock, the fall in
demand leads to a fall in private output, which, along with the high in the real interest
rate, causes government debt-to-GDP to rise. Hence a much larger cut in the public
wage bill is required to bring debt to the desired level, meaning that the consolidation
in this environment has large negative effects. The differences between the two
instruments appear less pronounced in a low inflation environment; yet, again, in
the long run public wage cuts lead to a reduction in the long-run unemployment
rate, while public vacancy cuts induce a persistent rise in unemployment.
The remainder of the paper is organised follows. In Section 3.2, we provide
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the details of the model. Section 3.3 discusses the results of the different policy
experiments and extensive sensitivity analysis. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The Model
We consider a two-country DSGE model of a monetary union with search and match-
ing frictions, endogenous labour force participation, and sticky prices in the short
run. The two countries, labeled Home and Foreign, are of sizes n and 1− n, respec-
tively. The following subsections describe the Home economy in more detail: the
structure of the Foreign economy is analogous. All variables are in per capita terms.
Where necessary, the conventional ? denotes foreign variables or parameters, and the
subscripts h and f denotes goods produced in the Home and Foreign country and
their respective prices.
There are four types of firms in each country: (i) a public firm that produces
a good used in private production, (ii) private competitive firms that use labour,
capital and the public good to produce a non-tradable intermediate good, (iii) mo-
nopolistic retailers that transform the intermediate good into a tradeable good, and
(iv) competitive final goods producers that use domestic and foreign produced re-
tail goods to produce a final, non-tradeable good which is used for investment and
consumption. Price rigidities arise at the retail level, while labour market frictions
occur in the intermediate goods sector. The representative household consists of
private and public employees, unemployed, and labour force non-participants. The
government collects taxes and uses revenues to finance the wages of public employ-
ees, the costs of opening new vacancies in the public sector and the provision of
unemployment benefits.
3.2.1 Labour markets
We consider search and matching frictions in both the private and public labour mar-
kets. In each period, jobs in each sector, j = p, g, are destroyed at a constant fraction
σj and a measure mj of new matches are formed. The evolution of employment in
each sector is thus given by:
njt+1 = (1− σj)njt +mjt (3.1)
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We assume that σp > σg in order to capture the fact that, in general, public employ-
ment is more permanent than private employment.1
The new matches are given by:
mjt = ρ
j
m(υ
j
t )
α(ujt)
1−α (3.2)
where the matching efficiency, ρjm, can differ in the two sectors. From the match-
ing functions specified above we can define, for each sector j, the probability of a
jobseeker being hired, ψhjt , and of a vacancy being filled, ψ
fj
t :
ψhjt ≡
mjt
ujt
(3.3)
ψfjt ≡
mjt
υjt
(3.4)
3.2.2 Households
The representative household consists of a continuum of infinitely lived agents. The
members of the household derive utility from leisure, which corresponds to the frac-
tion of members that are out of the labour force, lt, and a consumption bundle, ct.
Following Neiss and Pappa (2005), we also allow for variable labour effort, xt, which
leads to separable disutility. The instantaneous utility function is thus given by:
U(ct, lt, xt) =
c1−ηt
1− η + Φ
l1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
−Υ x
1+ξ
t
1 + ξ
where η is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, Φ > 0 is the
relative preference for leisure, ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply,
and Υ > 0 andξ are the utility parameters for variable labour effort.
At any point in time, a fraction npt (n
g
t ) of the household members are private
(public) employees. Campolmi and Gnocchi (2014) and Bruckner and Pappa (2012)
have added a labour force participation choice in New Keynesian models of equilib-
rium unemployment. Following Ravn (2008), the participation choice is modelled as
a trade-off between the cost of giving up leisure and the prospect of finding a job. In
particular, the household chooses the fraction of the unemployed actively searching
for a job, ut, and the fraction which are out of the labour force and enjoying leisure,
1For example, Gomes (2015a), Gomes (2015b) and Albrecht et al. (2014) find empirical evidence
that separation rates in the public sector are lower than the private sector in the UK, US and
Colombia respectively.
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lt, so that:
npt + n
g
t + ut + lt = 1 (3.5)
The household chooses the fraction of jobseekers searching in each sector: a share st
of jobseekers look for a job in the public sector, while the remainder, (1 − st), seek
employment in the private sector. That is, ugt ≡ stut and upt ≡ (1 − st)ut.2 This
decision will depend on the expected utility from searching in each sector, which in
turn depends on the probability of finding a job, ψhjt , the separation rate, σ
j, and
the wage in each sector. In other words, a wage differential can arise between the
two sectors in a non-degenerate equilibrium if there are differences in the number of
vacancies, the matching efficiency or the separation rate.3
The household owns the private capital stock, which evolves according to:
kpt+1 =
[
1− ω
2
(
ipt
ipt−1
− 1
)2]
ipt + (1− δp) kpt (3.6)
where ipt is private investment, δ
p is a constant depreciation rate and ω dictates the
size of investment adjustment costs.
The budget constraint, in real terms, is given by
(1 + τc) ct + i
p
t + bg,t+1 + etrf,t−1bf,t ≤ (1− τn) (wptnptxt + wgtngt ) + rt−1bg,t (3.7)
+ etbf,t+1 + [r
p
t − τk (rpt − δp)] kpt + but + Πpt + Tt
where wjt are the real wages in the two sectors, r
p
t is the real return on capital, b
denotes unemployment benefits, Πpt are the profits of the monopolistic retailers, dis-
cussed below, and τc, τk, τn, and Tt represent taxes on private consumption, private
capital, labour income and lump-sum transfers, respectively. bg,t are government
bonds which pay the real return rt−1, whereas bf,t denote liabilities with the Foreign
country. Although the nominal exchange rate in fixed, the interest rate on foreign
assets, rf,t, is still affected by consumer inflation differentials between the two coun-
tries, which are captured by the real exchange rate, et. In fact, we can define the
nominal interest rate at Home, Rt, through Fisher equation
2For simplicity, we will abstract from variable labour effort in the public sector.
3This point can be seen more clearly from the household’s first order conditions, provided in the
appendix.
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rt =
Rt
pit+1
(3.8)
where pit is the gross consumer inflation rate.
Thus the problem of the household is to choosect, ut, st, n
p
t+1, n
g
t+1, xt, i
p
t , k
p
t+1,
bg,t+1, bf,t+1 to maximise lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint, (3.7), the
law of motion of employment in each sector, (3.1), the law of motion of capital, (3.6),
and the composition of the household, (3.5). The resulting first order conditions
are provided in the appendix. For use below, we define the marginal value of an
additional private sector employee as:
V Hnpt = λctw
p
t xt(1− τn)− Φlϕt + (1− σp)λnpt (3.9)
= λctw
p
t xt(1− τn)− Φlϕt + (1− σp)βEt(V Hnpt+1)
where λct and λnpt are the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint and the
law of motion of private employment respectively.
3.2.3 Production
3.2.3.1 Intermediate goods firms
Intermediate goods are produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology:
ypt = (Atn
p
txt)
1−φ(kpt )
φ(ygt )
ν (3.10)
where At is a labour augmenting productivity factor, k
p
t and n
p
t are private capital
and labour inputs, xt is the effort intensity of labour. Following Barro (1990) and
Turnovsky (1999), we allow the public good, ygt , to enter the private production
function, taken as exogenous by the firms. The parameter ν regulates how the
public input affects private production: when ν is zero, the government good is
unproductive.
Since current hires give future value to intermediate firms, the optimization prob-
lem is dynamic and hence firms maximize the discounted value of future profits. The
number of workers currently employed, npt , is taken as given and the employment
decision concerns the number of vacancies posted in the current period, υpt , so as
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to employ the desired number of workers next period, npt+1.
4 Firms also decide
the amount of the private capital, kpt , to be rented from the household at rate r
p
t .
The problem of an intermediate firm with npt currently employed workers consists of
choosing kpt and υ
p
t to maximize:
Qp(npt ) = max
kpt ,υ
p
t
{
px,t(Atxtn
p
t )
1−φ(kpt )
φ(ygt )
ν − wptnptxt − rpt kpt − κυpt + Et
[
Λt,t+1Q
p(npt+1)
]}
(3.11)
where px,t is the relative price of intermediate goods, κ is a utility cost associated with
posting a new vacancy, and Λt,t+1 = β
λct+1
λct
is the discount factor. The maximization
takes place subject to the private employment transition equation, where the firm
takes the probability of the vacancy being filled as given:
npt+1 = (1− σp)npt + ψfpt υpt (3.12)
The first-order conditions are:
px,tφ
ypt
kpt
= rpt (3.13)
κ
ψfpt
= EtΛt,t+1[px,t+1(1− φ) y
p
t+1
npt+1
− wpt+1xt+1 + (1− σp)
κ
ψfpt+1
] (3.14)
According to (3.13) and (3.14) the value of the marginal product of private capital
should equal the real rental rate and the marginal cost of opening a vacancy should
equal the expected marginal benefit. The latter includes the marginal productivity
of labour minus the wage plus the continuation value, knowing that with probability
σp the match can be destroyed.
The expected value of the marginal job for the intermediate firm, V Fnpt is:
V Fnpt ≡
∂Qp(npt )
∂npt
= px,t(1− φ)y
p
t
npt
− wpt xt +
(1− σp)κ
ψfpt
(3.15)
3.2.3.2 Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by i on the
unit interval. Retailers buy intermediate goods and differentiate them with a technol-
ogy that transforms one unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods, and
4Firms adjust employment by varying the number of workers (extensive margin) rather than the
number of hours per worker. According to Hansen (1985), most of the employment fluctuations
arise from movements in this margin.
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thus the relative price of intermediate goods, px,t, coincides with the real marginal
cost faced by the retailers. Let yit be the quantity of output sold by retailer i. The
final consumption good can be expressed as:
yrt =
[ˆ 1
0
(yit)
−1
 di
] 
−1
where  > 1 is the constant elasticity of demand for each variety of retail goods.
The final good is sold at a price Ph,t =
(´
(Pi,h,t)
−1 di
) 1
−1 . The demand for each
intermediate good depends on its relative price and on aggregate demand
yi,t =
(
Pi,h,t
Ph,t
)−
yrt (3.16)
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in any given period each retailer can reset
its price with a fixed probability (1− χ). Firms that are able to reset their price
choose P ∗i,h,t so as to maximize expected real profits given by
Πt (i) = MaxP ∗i,h,tEt
∞∑
s=0
(βχ)s Λt,t+s
([
Pi,h,t
pt+s
− px,t+s
]
yi,t+s
)
subject to the demand schedule (3.16), in each period. Since all firms are ex-ante
identical, P ∗i,h,t = P
∗
h,t for all i. The resulting expression for p
∗
h,t ≡ P ∗h,t/Pt is
p∗h,t
ph,t
=

(− 1)
Nt
Dt (3.17)
where
Nt = px,tyrt + βχΛt,t+1 (pih,t+1)Nt+1 (3.18)
Dt = ph,tyrt + βχΛt,t+1 (pih,t+1)−1Dt+1 (3.19)
ph,t ≡ Ph,t/Pt is the real domestic price of yrt and pih,tdenotes producer inflation.
Under the assumption of Calvo pricing, the price index, in nominal terms, is given
by
Ph,t = χ (Ph,t−1)
−1 + (1− χ) (P ∗h,t)1− (3.20)
Retail goods are sold domestically and abroad. In aggregate,
yrt = yh,t + y
?
h,t (3.21)
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where yh,t is the share of retail goods sold domestically and y
?
h,t the quantity sold
abroad, and we have assumed the law of one price holds
ph,t = etp
?
h,t (3.22)
3.2.3.3 Final Goods Producer
Finally, in each country perfectly competitive firms produce a non-tradeable final
good by aggregating domestic and foreign aggregate retail goods using technology
yt =
[
($)
1
γ (yh,t)
γ−1
γ + (1−$) 1γ (τyf,t)
γ−1
γ
] γ
γ−1
where τ ≡ (1− n) /n normalizes the amount of imported goods at Home to per
capita terms. The home-bias parameter $ denotes the fraction of goods produced at
home that are used in the production of the final good. The elasticity of substitution
between home-produced and imported goods is given by γ. Final good producers
maximize profits yt− ph,tyh,t− pf,tτyf,t each period. Solving for the optimal demand
functions gives
yh,t = $ (ph,t)
−γ yt (3.23)
yf,t = (1−$) (pf,t)−γ n
1− nyt (3.24)
The consumer price index, Pt, is defined by substituting out yh,t and yf,t in the
CES above by the respective demand curves, which yields
Pt = $ (Ph,t)
1−γ + (1−$) (Pf,t)1−γ (3.25)
3.2.4 Government
The government sector produces the public good using public capital and labour:
ygt = (Atn
g
t )
1−µ(k¯g)µ (3.26)
where we assume that productivity shocks are not sector specific and µ is the share
of public capital, k¯g, which is assumed fixed. The public good, which is provided for
free, provides productivity and utility enhancing services. Government expenditure
consists of public wages, public vacancy costs and unemployment benefits, while
revenues come from the consumption, capital income, labour income and lump-sum
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taxes. The government deficit is therefore defined by:
DFt = w
g
tn
g
t + κv
g
t + but − TRt
where TRt ≡ τn(wptnptxt + wgtngt ) + τk(rpt − δp)kpt + T + τcct denotes tax revenues.
The government budget constraint is given by:
bg,t +DFt =
bg,t+1
rt
(3.27)
We assume that tax rates are constant and fixed at their steady state levels, and
we do not consider them as active instruments for fiscal consolidation. Similarly we
assume that government investment is held fixed at it’s steady state value, ig = δgkg,
keeping the public capital stock constant. Thus the government has two potential
fiscal instruments, vg and wg. We consider each instrument separately, assuming that
if one is active, the other remains fixed at its steady state value. For Ψ ∈ {vg,wg},
we assume fiscal rules of the form, following Erceg and Linde (2013) and Pappa et
al. (2015):
Ψt = Ψ
(1−βΨ0) ΨβΨ0t−1
( b˜g,t
b∗g,t
)βΨ1 (
∆b˜g,t+1
∆b∗g,t+1
)βΨ2(1−βΨ0) (3.28)
where b˜g,t ≡ bg,trgdpt is the debt-to-GDP ratio and b∗g,t is the target debt-to-GDP ratio,
given by the AR(2) process:
log b∗g,t − log b∗g,t−1 = µb + ρ1(log b∗g,t−1 − log b∗g,t−2)− ρ2 log b∗g,t−1 − εbt
where εbt is a white noise shock representing a fiscal consolidation.
5
3.2.5 Closing the model
3.2.5.1 Monetary policy
There is a single independent monetary authority that sets the nominal interest rate
to target zero net inflation, subject to the ZLB:
R?t = Max
{
1, ρR?t−1 + (1− ρ) ρpip˜it
}
(3.29)
5Notice that public wage cuts reduce the wage bill in the public sector in the same period, while
public vacancy cuts reduce it with a lag from next period.
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where p˜it is the sum of national consumer inflations, weighted by population sizes,
npit + (1− n) pi?t . For the Home, consumer inflation is defined as:
pih,t
pit
=
ph,t
ph,t−1
(3.30)
With fixed nominal exchange rates, the real exchange rate equals the ratio of con-
sumer prices:
et
et−1
=
pi?t
pit
(3.31)
Finally, and to render the model stationary, we introduce a risk premium charged
to Home households depending on the relative size of net-foreign-liabilities to total
output:
rf,t = r
?
t exp
{
Γτ¯ et
bf,t+1
rgdpt
}
(3.32)
where Γ is the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to the liabilities.
3.2.5.2 Resource constraint
The non-tradeable domestic final good is sold for consumption and for investment:
yt = ct + i
p
t + κυ
p
t + κυ
g
t (3.33)
and, following, Gomes (2015a), total output is defined as private output plus the
wage bill:
rgdpt = px,ty
p
t + w
g
tn
g
t (3.34)
Aggregating the budget constraint of households using the market clearing condi-
tions, the budget constraint of the government, and aggregate profits Vt =
´
i
ΠR (i) di,
we obtain the law of motion for net foreign assets, which is given by:
et (rf,t−1bf,t − bf,t+1) = nxt (3.35)
and where nxt are net exports defined as:
nxt = ph,ty
?
h,t − pf,tτyf,t (3.36)
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3.2.5.3 Wage bargaining
Private sector wages are determined by ex post (after matching) Nash bargaining.
Workers and firms split rents and the part of the surplus they receive depends on
their bargaining power. If we denote by ϑ ∈ (0, 1) the firms’ bargaining power, the
Nash bargaining problem is to maximize the weighted sum of log surpluses:
max
wpt
{
(1− ϑ) lnV Hnpt + ϑ lnV Fnpt
}
where V Hnpt and V
F
npt have been defined above. The optimization problem leads to the
following solution for wpt :
wpt xt = (1− ϑ)px,t(1− φ)
ypt
npt
+
ϑ
(1− τn)λc,tΦl
ϕ
t (3.37)
Hence, the equilibrium wage is a weighted average of the marginal product of em-
ployment and the disutility from labour, with the weights given by the firm and
household’s bargaining power respectively.6
3.2.6 Model Solution and Calibration
We solve the model by linearising the equilibrium conditions around a non-stochastic
steady state in which all prices are flexible, the price of the private good is normalized
to unity, and inflation is zero.
Table 3.1 shows some of the key parameters and steady-state values targeted in
our calibration.We set n = 0.5 and consider the Home and Foreign block as two
perfectly symmetric countries.7
When considering the ZLB, which is a non-linear constraint, we use the Occbin
toolkit provided by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015). Following the literature, this
environment is induced by assuming a positive shock to the household’s discount
rate, β, in both countries.8 This causes inflation to fall across the monetary union,
driving the nominal interest rate to its lower bound.
6See the appendix for the full derivation.
7Full details of the calibration strategy are provided in the appendix.
8We assume that the shock decays with auto-regressive parameter 0.5.
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Table 3.1: Calibration of Parameters and Steady-State Values
Parameter/Variable Description Value
n Size of Home Block 0.5
Preferences:
β Household discount factor 0.99
η Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution 1
ϕ Inverse Frisch Elasticity of Labour 4
Labour Market:
(1− l) Labour force participation 65%
u/(1−l) Unemployment rate 10%
ng/n Share of public employment 18%
κ/wp Vacancy costs as a share of wages 4.5%
Production:
ν Productivity of public good 0.05
φ, µ Share of capital in production 0.36
kg/kp Public-private capital ratio 0.31
χ Price-stickiness 0.75
Policy Parameters:
ρpi Taylor-rule inflation targeting parameter 2.5
ρ1, ρ2 Debt-target law of motion 0.85, 0.0001
b˜g Steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio 50%
3.3 Results
We consider a shock which drives the debt-to-GDP ratio target around 2pp below
its steady state after 10 quarters. We simulate the response to this shock under the
two alternative policy instruments, υg and wg. We then consider the same shock in
a low inflation environment.
To further investigate the results, we also show the role of the different mechnisms
of the model. Firstly, with respect to the assumptions about monetary and fiscal
policy, we consider the role of the consolidation shock, the speed of adjustment during
consolidation and the strength of the monetary policy response. Finally, we carry out
sensitivity analysis with respect to some of the parameters in the model, looking in
particular at the productivity of the public good, the size of investment adjustment
costs and the elasticity of labour supply.
3.3.1 Consolidation in Normal Times
In this section we analyse the role of consolidation in normal times, when the economy
is not subject to deflationary shocks.
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3.3.1.1 Quantity-based Measures: Public Vacancy Cuts
We start by analyzing the effects of fiscal consolidation when vacancy cuts are as-
sumed to be the fiscal policy instrument for achieving the lower debt target. Results
from this exercise are presented in the solid lines in Figure 3.5. We see that the cut
in public vacancies causes a fall in public employment, and hence both the public
wage bill falls with a lag.
The share of jobseekers searching in the public sector falls as workers move to-
wards the private sector, causing a fall in private wages, a rise in private labour
demand, and hence a rise in private employment. At the same time, the reduction in
expenditure on the public wage bill creates a positive wealth effect for the household,
causing a rise in private consumption and investment. The latter raises the private
capital stock. Thus, private output increases, despite the fall in public output, which
also serves as an input in private production. The unemployment rate increases per-
sistently due to the fall in public employment and the increase in the labour force
participation rate. Finally, despite the boost to private output, real GDP falls after
the consolidation as a result of the fall in the public wage bill.
3.3.1.2 Price-based Measures: Public Wage Cuts
The dashed lines in Figure 3.5 depicts the case in which fiscal consolidation is achieved
through cuts in the public wage. Despite the fact that the public wage falls less
steeply than vacancies, the public wage bill falls by a lot more as public employment
also falls, and so the consolidation is much more effective.
The public wage cut causes a significant shift in jobseekers towards the private
sector, leading to a fall in public employment.9 As before, the subsequent decrease
of the private wage reduces marginal costs of firms in the private sector and this
increases the demand for labour and boosts private employment. Differently from
before, the adjustment is less sluggish, as labour force participation also rises, and
so the unemployment rate falls during the consolidation. As before, despite the fall
in income, we see that again the consolidation causes a positive wealth effect for
the household, raising consumption and investment. Hence, despite the fall in public
output, we again see a rise in private output. Nonetheless, real GDP falls much more
steeply than the case of vacancy cuts due to the fall in the public wage bill.
Hence, in line with Bradley et al. (2015), we find that in normal times cuts in the
public wage bill reduce public sector employment and increase hiring in the private
9Recall that public output moves proportionally to public employment.
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sector. However, our results indicate that the effects on aggregate unemployment are
different for the two instruments considered: in the case of public wage cuts (price-
based measure) the increase in private-sector employment prevails and we observe a
fall in the unemployment rate, while in the case of public vacancy cuts (quantity-
based measure) the fall in public employment is such that leads to an increase in the
unemployment rate.
3.3.2 Consolidation in a Low Inflation Environment
In this section we analyse how our conclusions about fiscal consolidation through
public wage bill cuts change when the monetary union operates in a low inflation
environment.
3.3.2.1 Quantity-based Measures: Public Vacancy Cuts
Figure 3.6 shows the impulse response functions when public vacancies are the active
consolidation instrument in a low inflation environment. For comparabilty purposes,
the solid lines depict the baseline simulations in response to the fiscal consolidation
shock only. First, notice that the effects of the consolidation shock alone are very
small compared to the effects of the discount rate shock. The dashed lines depict
the responses in the presence of the shock to the household’s discount rate when the
ZLB constraint is not imposed, while the dash-dotted line depicts the responses when
imposing the ZLB. We see that the nominal interest rate falls sharply. Relative to the
unconstrained case, when the nominal rate hits the ZLB, the real interest rate remains
too high and inflation falls by a much larger amount. Importantly, the discount rate
shock has important direct consequences for public debt. In the unconstrained case,
the debt-to-GDP ratio falls below the target, such that public vacancies and the
public wage bill actually rise. In contrast, when the ZLB constraint is imposed, the
debt-to-GDP ratio rises sharply and remains well above its initial level, despite a
large fall in public vacancies.
With the negative demand shock, we observe a fall in private consumption and
investment. The demand contraction leads to a fall in private labour demand. The
negative wealth effect is so strong that agents increase further their participation,
leading to a considerable increase in unemployment, and mitigates the fall in private
employment. Nonetheless, the fall in investment, and hence capital, as well as labour
effort and the public output, lead to a significant contraction of private output.
The simultaneous contraction in the private and the public sector leads to a rise
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in public debt despite the consolidation. This means that public vacancies need to
fall by much more than the baseline case, reducing public employment and output
by more. This further reinforces the fall in private output and makes consolidation
difficult to achieve.
3.3.2.2 Price-based Measures: Public Wage Cuts
Figure 3.7 plots impulse responses for the case of public wage cuts in the baseline,
unconstrained and constrained cases.
Responses look very similar with the responses of the vacancy cut case. When the
interest rate is not bounded by the zero constraint, the discount rate shock causes
a sharp fall in debt-to-GDP and so consolidation is reversed, leading to increases in
public wages. This shifts labour supply towards the public sector, reducing employ-
ment in the private sector and contracting private output despite the surge in private
investment induced by the low real interest rate. On the other hand, public output
expands so much that total real GDP increases after the first 4 quarters.
Moving to the more interesting case of the equilibrium in which the ZLB con-
straint is imposed, we see that inflation falls much more, keeping the real interest
rate higher than the unconstrained case. The sharp rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio
enduces a much larger fall in public wages, and hence the public wage bill and public
employment. Accordingly, the response of the private labour market is amplified
relative to the baseline case, including a larger rise in private employment, except for
a mitigated rise in labour demand, due to the contraction in private consumption.
The higher real rate means that investment rises less than in the unconstrained
case, but it does not fall, as in the case of vacancy cuts. However, as before, the
fall in labour effort and public output lead to a significant contraction both private
output and real GDP.
To sum up, the fall in private output induced by the negative effects of the
deflationary shock makes it more difficult for the government to consolidate debt
and attenuates the positive effects of the consolidation in normal times. In this case,
public wage cuts lead to a rise in unemployment for several periods, and have a similar
negative effect on private output, hence they are no longer obviously preferable to
vacancy cuts.
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3.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis I: Fiscal and Monetary Policy
We now carry out a series of alternative simulations to investigate the sensitivity of
our results to the assumptions we made regarding fiscal and monetary policy. For the
purpose of this section, for brevity we present only the IRFs of some key variables,
and present only the simulations at the ZLB. All other IRFs are available from the
authors on request.
3.3.3.1 The Role of the Consolidation Shock
To understand better how consolidation affects the economy at the ZLB, in this
subsection we compare the dynamics of the economy in the baseline simulations to
the economy at the ZLB when the consolidation is not imposed. The results are
presented in Figures 3.8 and 3.9 for vacancy cuts and wage cuts, respectively.
For the case of vacancy cuts, the presence of fiscal consolidation when a defla-
tionary shock hits the economy makes very little difference. The deflationary shock
increases debt and according to the debt rule specified in Equation (3.28), public
vacancies react even without the consolidation shock. The response of the private
sector is only marginally affected by the consolidation shock, for example private
employment falls by more without consolidation since there is less reallocation of
jobseekers from the public sector. Nonetheless, the responses of private output and
real GDP are very similar.
The differences are slightly more noticeable in the case of public wage cuts. The
consolidation in this case does help the faster recovery of the private sector by leading
to stronger positive reaction of investment and private employment, which in fact
initially falls without the fiscal consolidation. As a result, private output falls less
under this scenario, making the recovery of the economy following the combined
shocks faster.
3.3.3.2 The Speed of Adjustment during Consolidation
In Figures 3.10 and 3.11 we examine how our conclusions would change if we consid-
ered a faster speed of adjustment for the fiscal consolidations. Notice that because
of difficulties in satisfying the stability criteria in the model we cannot freely change
the parameters of debt adjustments for the two instruments. Nonetheless, faster
debt adjustment seems to imply that for both fiscal instruments the recovery of the
private sector is somewhat faster. In the case of vacancy cuts, the main effect is
seen in private employment and the participation rate, while private output and real
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GDP look very similar and the debt-to-GDP ratio only falls slightly faster after 6
periods. For public wage cuts, the differences are again slightly more noticeable, but
again the final effect on private output and debt-to-GDP is negligible, although the
stronger fall in the public wage bill does lead to a more negative response of real
GDP.
3.3.3.3 The Strength of Monetary Policy
In Figures 3.12 and 3.13 we examine the sensitivity of our results to the conduct of
monetary policy at the union level. In particular we compare the baseline case to a
case were ρpi=1.1.
The strength of monetary policy has different effects in the two cases. For va-
cancy cuts, the responses begin to diverge around 3 or 4 quarters after shock: once
the economy is close to exiting the ZLB, the lax inflation targeting implies a con-
tinuing high real rate, which leads to higher private investment and higher private
output. This lowers the debt-to-GDP ratio, requiring a smaller contraction in public
vacancies, and hence mitigating the negative effects of the consolidation.
Contrary to this, in the case of public wage cuts, lax monetary policy makes con-
solidation harder. The rise in debt-to-GDP is higher from the first period, implying
a larger adjustment in public wages. This amplifies the rise in private employment,
but mitigates the rise in investment and hence the response of private output is quite
similar. The larger fall in the public wage bill implies a bigger fall in real GDP.
3.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis II: Deep Parameters
Our results might be sensitive not only to the policy specification we adopt for the
fiscal and monetary authority, but also to some assumptions about deep parameters
in the model. In this section we examine some of them that we find are crucial for
our analysis.
3.3.4.1 The Productivity of Public Output
The results we present are, of course, very sensitive to the assumed value for the
productivity of the public good, ν, as this is crucial in determining the effects of cuts
in public wages or vacancies even in the baseline model when the ZLB does not bind.
Despite the positive effects of the consolidation on private employment and capital,
we have seen that both instruments lead to a fall in public output, and this leads
to a direct negative effect in the private production function. The balance of these
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effects, and hence the effect of the consolidation on private output, depends on the
productivity of the public good.
Given the importance of the parameter ν, it is only natural to ask how the
productivity of the public output affects our conclusions about the effects of fiscal
consolidation in the ZLB. Figure 3.14 and 3.15 compare the responses of the baseline
model with the responses when we assume a higher productivity of the public good
in private production, setting ν= 0.1. As it is clear from the results, making the
public sector more productive implies a need for stronger fiscal consolidation after
the discount factor shock, and a larger and more persistent fall in private output.
3.3.4.2 Investment Adjustment Costs
Investment adjustment costs are crucial determinants of the reaction of private cap-
ital to the consolidation shock, in particular in the presence of the demand shock.
As we saw, the negative demand shock, by increasing the desire to save, increases
private investment, which boosts private output and aids the consolidation effort.
This is clearly indicated in Figures 3.16 and 3.17 where we plot the responses of the
economy when we increase the adjustment cost parameter from 0.5 to 3.5. With
higher adjustment costs, investment and hence private capital do not rise as much,
private output falls more, and the debt-to-GDP rises more.
3.3.4.3 Endogenous Labour Force Participation
The assumption of labour force participation could also affect our results since, as
we have seen in the baseline analysis, agents adjust their participation decision when
they feel the possibility of finding a job increases or when they suffer from a negative
wealth effect. In turn, the change in participation affects labour supply and thus
the equilibrium wage and production levels. In Figures 3.18 and 3.19 we compare
the responses of the model economy when we shut the participation margin with the
baseline responses.
The responses look very similar when agents are not allowed to adjust their
participation. As discussed above, the consolidation creates a shift of jobseekers
towards the private sector. Even when labour participation does not increase, the
reduction in public employment increases the pool of unemployed, and this shift
towards the private sector can still occur. The effect on private employment is
slightly mitigated, as is the rise in private investment, meaning that private output
falls slightly more. However, these effects are small.
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3.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis III: Open vs. Closed Economy
Finally, in Figures 3.20-3.23 we compare the responses of the open economy, described
above, to a closed economy version in which we consider the Home block in autarky.
Comparing the closed and open economy versions in the baseline simulations, we
can see in Figures 3.20 and 3.21 that the effects of the fiscal consolidation are largely
unaffected by the presence of the second country. The fact that the Home economy
has independent monetary policy acts in a similar way to strict monetary policy case
described above, since the nominal interest rate is now targetting domestic inflation
only. Hence, we see that the consolidation is more successful in the closed economy
for both instruments, therefore requiring a smaller adjustment in the instrument and
hence mitigating the negative effects of the consolidation. This confirms the results
of Erceg and Linde (2013) about spending cuts: a fiscal consolidation in a monetary
union is more detrimental relative to the case of independent monetary policy.
However, the differences between the two cases at the ZLB, shown in Figures
3.22 and 3.23, are more notable. These effects are mainly driven by the fact that
inflation falls by more in the case of a monetary union and, as a result, the real
interest rate falls and private investment increases by much less than in the case of a
closed economy. In the closed economy, therefore, the initial rise in the debt-to-GDP
ratio is much smaller. This implies that the consolidation is much more successful
for both instruments, which then mitigates the negative effects on private output
and real GDP.
3.4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have set up a DSGE model of a monetary union with search
and matching frictions, nominal rigidities, and public employment. This rich model
allows us to study non-trivial reallocation of agents in and out of the labour force,
and between the public and private sector. In the baseline case, a fiscal consolidation
through a cut in public wages is able to reduce the public debt-to-GDP ratio faster
than public vacancy costs, although both have similar effects on private output and
lead to a reduction in public employment and an increase in private-sector hirings.
However, in the case of public wage cuts the increase in private-sector employment
prevails, leading to a fall in the unemployment rate, while in the case of public
vacancy cuts the fall in public employment is such that raises the unemployment rate.
Hence, public wage cuts are a preferable consolidation strategy to public vacancy cuts
in normal times.
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In a low inflation environment a much larger cut in the public wage bill is re-
quired to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio to the desired level. The high real interest
rate when the ZLB constraint is binding leads to a rise in public debt and, as a
result, makes consolidation more costly. The fall in demand creates a drag on the
private sector, meaning that the consolidation in this environment has large negative
effects. The differences between the two instruments appear less pronounced in a
low inflation environment; nonetheless public wage cuts lead to a reduction in the
unemployment rate in the medium run, while public vacancy cuts induce a persistent
rise in unemployment.
As our sensitivity analysis showed, our model and parameter assumptions are im-
portant for determining the results. Given our model structure we could not extend
our sensitivity analysis to all possible assumptions we have adopted. Nonetheless
there are three directions in particular in which we plan to extend our analysis.
Firstly, with respect to the labour market, we know that the allocation between
private and public sector is key for our results. However, we have abstracted from
the fact that a jobseeker with previous experience in a particular sector will be more
likely to find a job in the same sector. It would therefore be interesting to introduce a
friction in the reallocation of workers between the public and private sector. Related
to this, it would be interesting to allow for wage rigidities, which could be important
particularly in the low inflation environment. Secondly, we saw that the productivity
of the public good is also key. It is therefore important to consider alternative
formulations for the public sector, for example providing a utility-enhancing good
directly to the households. We know that the provision of such a good is important
for determining the response of the household to changes in fiscal policy, and so it may
have important consequences for the macro-economic impact of the consolidation.
Finally, we would like to consider alternative shocks that can replicate the ZLB crisis.
In particular, we saw that the discount rate shock created an investment boom during
the ZLB crisis, although the size depends on the investment adjustment costs. This
is contrary to the experience in Europe since the crisis, where investment has fallen
and failed to recover. Alternative shocks, or combinations of shocks, which can
reproduce the current low inflation environment more closely may provide deeper
insights. In future versions of this paper we plan to extend our analysis to these and
other primitives of our model.
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Figure 3.5: Fiscal Consolidation in Normal Times: Vacancy Cuts vs. Wage Cuts
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Figure 3.6: Fiscal Consolidation in a Low Inflation Environment: Public Vacancy
Cuts
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Figure 3.7: Fiscal Consolidation in a Low Inflation Environment: Public Wage Cuts
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Figure 3.8: Public Vacancy Cuts in a Low Inflation Environment: the Role of Con-
solidation
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Figure 3.9: Public Wage Cuts in a Low Inflation Environment: the Role of Consoli-
dation
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Figure 3.10: Public Vacancy Cuts in a Low Inflation Environment: the Speed of
Consolidation
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Figure 3.11: Public Wage Cuts in a Low Inflation Environment: the Speed of Con-
solidation
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Figure 3.12: Public Vacancy Cuts in a Low Inflation Environment: the Role of
Monetary Policy Strength
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Figure 3.13: Public Wage Cuts in a Low Inflation Environment: the Role of Monetary
Policy Strength
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Figure 3.14: Public Vacancy Cuts in a Low Inflation Environment: the Productivity
of Public Output
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Figure 3.15: Public Wage Cuts in a Low Inflation Environment: the Productivity of
Public Output
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Figure 3.16: Public Vacancy Cuts in a Low Inflation Environment: Investment Ad-
justment Costs
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Figure 3.17: Public Wage Cuts in a Low Inflation Environment: Investment Adjust-
ment Costs
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Figure 3.18: Public Vacancy Cuts in a Low Inflation Environment: Exogenous
Labour Force Participation
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Figure 3.19: Public Wage Cuts in a Low Inflation Environment: Exogenous Labour
Force Participation
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Figure 3.20: Public Vacancy Cuts in Normal Times: Closed versus Open Economy
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Figure 3.21: Public Wage Cuts in Normal Times: Closed versus Open Economy
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Figure 3.22: Public Vacancy Cuts in a Low Inflation Environment: Closed versus
Open Economy
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Figure 3.23: Public Wage Cuts in a Low Inflation Environment: Closed versus Open
Economy
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Appendix
Household’s maximisation problem
The household’s Lagrangean can be written as
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
c1−ηt
1− η + Φ
(1− npt − ngt − ut)1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
−Υ x
1+ξ
t
1 + ξ
− λc,t [(1 + τc) ct + ipt + bg,t+1 + etrf,t−1bf,t − [rpt − τk (rpt − δp)] kpt
−rt−1bg,t − etbf,t+1 − (1− τn) (wptnptxt + wgtngt )− but − Πpt − Tt]
− λk,t
[
kpt+1 −
[
1− ω
2
(
ipt
ipt−1
− 1
)2]
ipt − (1− δp) kpt
]
− λnp,t
[
npt+1 − (1− σp)npt − ψhpt (1− st)ut
]
− λng ,t
[
ngt+1 − (1− σg)ngt − ψhgt stut
]}
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where the household’s composition has been substituted into the utility function,
and the household takes as given the probability of finding a job in each sector and
does not internalise the effect of their choice of ujton the number of matches. The
choice variables are ct, i
p
t , k
p
t+1, n
p
t+1, n
g
t+1, ut, st, xt, bg,t+1 and bf,t+1.
The first order conditions are:
[wrt ct]
λc,t (1 + τc) = c
−η
t (38)
[wrt ipt ]
λc,t−λk,t
{
1− ω
2
(
ipt
ipt−1
− 1
)2
− ω
(
ipt
ipt−1
− 1
)
ipt
ipt−1
}
= βλk,t+1ω
(
ipt+1
ipt
− 1
)(
ipt+1
ipt
)2
(39)
[
wrt kpt+1
]
λk,t = β
{
λk,t+1 (1− δp) + λc,t+1
[
rpt+1 − τk
(
rpt+1 − δp
)]}
(40)[
wrt npt+1
]
λnp,t = β
[
λnp,t+1 (1− σp) + λc,t+1 (1− τn)wpt+1xt+1 − Φlϕt+1
]
(41)[
wrt ngt+1
]
λng ,t = β
[
λng ,t+1 (1− σg) + λc,t+1 (1− τn)wgt+1 − Φlϕt+1
]
(42)
[wrt ut]
Φlϕt = λc,tb + λnp,tψ
hp
t (1− st) + λng ,tψhgt st (43)
[wrt st]
λng ,tψ
hg
t = λnp,tψ
hp
t (44)
[wrt xt]
Υxξt = λc,t (1− τn)wptnpt (45)
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[wrt bg,t+1]
1 = β
λc,t+1
λc,t
rt (46)
[wrt bf,t+1]
1 = β
λc,t+1
λc,t
et+1
et
rf,t (47)
We can define the marginal value to the household of having an additional member
employed in the private sector, as follows:
V hnpt ≡
∂L
∂npt
= λctw
p
t xt(1− τn)− Φlϕt + (1− σp)λnpt (48)
= λctw
p
t xt(1− τn)− Φlϕt + (1− σp)βEt(V hnpt+1)
where the second equalities come from equation (41).
Derivation of the private wage
The Nash bargaining problem is to maximize the weighted sum of log surpluses:
max
wpt
{
(1− ϑ) lnV hnpt + ϑ lnV fnpt
}
where V hnjt and V
f
njt
are defined as:
V hnpt ≡
∂L
∂npt
= λctw
p
t xt(1− τnt )− Φlϕt + (1− σp)λnpt (49)
V Fnpt ≡
∂Qp
∂npt
= px,t(1− φ)y
p
t
npt
− wpt xt +
(1− σp)κ
ψfpt
(50)
The first order conditions of this optimization problem is:
ϑV hnpt = (1− ϑ)λct(1− τnt )V fnpt (51)
Plugging the expressions for the value functions into the FOC, we can rearrange to
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find the expression for the private wage. Using (49),(50) and (51) we obtain:
wpt xt = (1−ϑ)[px,t(1−φ)
ypt
npt
+
(1− σp)κ
ψfpt
] +
ϑ
(1− τn)λc,t (Φl
ϕ
t − (1−σp)λnpt) (52)
Finally, taking the time t expectation of (51) evaluated at time t+ 1, and using
the FOCs of the household and firm, we obtain
ϑλnpt = (1− ϑ)λct(1− τnt )
κ
ψfpt
which allows us to simplify (52) to obtain the final expression for the private wage
wpt xt = (1− ϑ)px,t(1− φ)
ypt
npt
+
ϑ
(1− τn)λc,tΦl
ϕ
t (53)
Calibration
Below, we outline in detail the calibration strategy. In places, a superscript j is
used to indicate a variable in both the private and public sector. Unless otherwise
stated, the two countries are symmetric, and we assume that bf = 0, so that there
is balanced trade at steady state.
Labour market variables
We set e = 1, such that it does not effect the rest of the steady state. We calibrate
the labour force participation rate, the unemployment rate, and the share of public
employment in total employment to match the observed average values from Italian
data: 1 − l = 65%, urate = u
1−l = 10% and
ng
np+ng
= 18%. From these we get u, np
and ng.
We set the separation rates at σp = 6.3% and σg = 6%. This gives us mj = σjnj,
from the steady state version of the law of motion of employment. We calibrate the
ratio of unemployed searching in two sectors s = 20%, which also gives us uj and so
ψhj by its definition.
Since there is no exact estimate for the value of the private vacancy-filling prob-
ability, ψfp, in the literature, we use what is considered as standard by setting it
equal to 0.1 and then we assume that ψfp = ψfg. This gives us υj by inverting the
definition of ψfj.
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The elasticity in the matching functions, α, is set equal to 0.5. Then the efficiency
parameter for private matches, ρpm, is given by inverting the matching function.
Production
We set the capital depreciation rates, δp, equal to 2%. The tax rates on capital and
labour income are calibrated to 30%. The return on capital, rp, is determined by the
household’s first order condition with respect to capital.
The elasticity of demand for intermediate goods, , is set equal to 10, which
gives a markup of 11%. The CPI in both countries is normalised to one, and their
definitions are used to derive ph and pf . We assume a steady state subsidy offsets
the markup, so that px = ph.
The stochastic labour productivity, A, is normalised to one. We set the capital
share in the production function of both the public and private good equal to 0.36,
and set the productivity of the public good in private production, ν, equal to 0.05.
Finally, using data from Kamps (2006) we set k
g
kp
= 0.31, close to the mean value for
1970-2002. This gives us yp, yg, kp and kg from the two production functions and
the firm’s first order condition with respect to capital, and ip from the law of motion
of private capital ip = δpkp.
Following Gal´ı (2011), we calibrate the cost of posting a vacancy, κ, by targeting
vacancy costs as a fraction of the real private wage, κ
wp
= 4.5%. We set the replace-
ment rate, b
wp
, equal to 40%, in the range [0.2, 0.4] in Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001). Then we can get wp from the firm’s FOC with respect to private vacancies.
Households
We derive private consumption from the resource constraint given yp, ip, κ and υj.
We set the consumption tax rate to 15%, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
1
η
, equal to 1, the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, 1
ϕ
, equal to 0.25 (in the range of
Domeij and Floden, 2006). From the household’s first order conditions we can then
derive λc and λnp , and set Φ = l
−ϕ(λcb + ψhpλnp). The firm’s bargaining power is
set by inverting the solution of the wage bargaining problem. Following Neiss and
Pappa (2011) we set ξ = 0.5, and set Υ = −λcwpnp to ensure e = 1.
Finally, we derive λng and w
g from the household’s remaining first order condi-
tions, and this also allows us to define total output, rgdp = yp + wgng.
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Fiscal Policy
We set the steady state annual debt-to-GDP ratio equal to 50%, so that b˜g = 4∗50%.
Using the government’s budget constraint in steady state, we have DF = (β −
1)b˜grgdp. Finally, we calibrate the steady state value for lump-sum transfers, T ,
from the definition of the deficit.
Other parameters
Finally, we set the probability that a firm does not change its price within a given pe-
riod, χ, equal to 0.75, the Taylor rule coefficient, ζpi, equal to 2.5, and the adjustment
costs parameter, ω, equal to 0.5. Finally, we set the parameters for the persistence
of the debt-target shock,ρ1 and ρ2, equal to 0.85 and 0.0001, respectively.
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